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Presumptively Awful: How the Federal
Government Is Failing To Protect the
Constitutional Rights of Those
Adjudicated as Mentally Ill, as Illustrated
by the § 922(g)(4) Circuit Split
Abstract
The Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits are split as to whether the
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) federal firearms ban violates the Second
Amendment rights of those who were once adjudicated as mentally
ill but have since returned to good mental health. In Beers v.
Attorney General, the Third Circuit applied its own unique
framework and held that § 922(g)(4) is constitutional. Meanwhile,
the Sixth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny in Tyler v. Hillsdale
County Sheriff’s Department and deemed the statute
unconstitutional, while in Mai v. United States, the Ninth Circuit
also applied intermediate scrutiny but held that § 922(g)(4) is
constitutional. This Comment explores each circuit’s approach to
adjudicating these Second Amendment claims, as well as the
broader constitutional issues that § 922(g)(4) and its accompanying
statutes for relief implicate. Specifically, this Comment asserts that
these statutes violate the equal protection and due process rights of
many of those adjudicated as mentally ill because federal law
provides that citizens in only thirty states may petition for relief from
§ 922(g)(4). Ultimately, this Comment proposes an amended statute
for relief to preserve the constitutional rights of those adjudicated
as mentally ill while still maintaining a high standard for relief to
protect public safety. Alternatively, this Comment asserts that
901
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courts assessing Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(4)
should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s approach of deferring to
Congress’s intent to reduce gun violence while emphasizing that
mental illness is not necessarily permanent and should not be
stigmatized. Finally, this Comment analyzes the potential efficacy
of asserting equal protection and due process claims challenging
the constitutionality of § 922(g)(4) and federal relief statutes.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between mental illness and individual rights has been
lengthy, tumultuous, and currently can be characterized as strained, at best.1
A recent circuit split between the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits as to the
constitutionality of the federal firearms ban illustrates just how messy this
relationship can be.2 Indeed, the federal firearms ban, or 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(4), and its accompanying statutes for relief, jeopardize the due
process, equal protection, and Second Amendment rights of those who were
once involuntarily committed but have since returned to good mental health.3
Section 922(g)(4) operates as a lifetime firearm prohibition for those
previously adjudicated as mentally ill, and circuit courts are taking divergent
approaches to Second Amendment claims challenging this statute.4
Moreover, the statutory scheme for relief from § 922(g)(4)’s restrictions only
provides individuals residing in thirty states with the opportunity to petition
for relief, posing due process and equal protection issues.5
This Comment seeks to explore the intricacies of the involuntary
commitment system, Second Amendment jurisprudence, and § 922(g)(4).6
Analyzing judicial precedent, the aforementioned circuit split, and the issues
posed by the conflicting interests at play, this Comment highlights the need
for the federal firearms ban to maintain a high standard for relief while
ensuring the constitutional rights of all Americans are adequately preserved
with appropriate consideration of their mental health status.7
Part II will explore involuntary commitment’s standards and history, as
well as the evolution of American gun control as it relates to mental illness.8
Part III will establish where Second Amendment jurisprudence stands as it
relates to mental illness, how it has evolved, and how the circuit courts are
1. See infra Part II. See generally O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975); Laura L.
Rovner, Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1082 (2004).
2. See Beers v. Att’y Gen., 927 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, judgment vacated,
140 S. Ct. 2758 (2020); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 685 (6th Cir. 2016);
Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1121 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2566 (2021); see
also infra Part III.
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4); infra Part IV.
4. See § 922(g)(4); Beers, 927 F.3d at 158; Tyler, 837 F.3d at 685; Mai, 952 F.3d at 1121.
5. See 34 U.S.C. § 40915; State Profiles: NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP)
Awards
FY
2009–2020,
BUREAU
JUST.
STATS.,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=491#funding (last visited Feb. 6, 2022).
6. See infra Parts II, III.
7. See infra Parts II, III, IV.
8. See infra Part II.
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split on § 922(g)(4) cases.9 Part IV delves into the relationship between
mental health, gun control, and public safety.10 Additionally, this Part
proposes solutions to protect public safety and individual rights while
avoiding furthering the stigma surrounding mental illness.11 The proposed
solutions advocate for legislative reform, suggest the superior approach for
assessing Second Amendment challenges to the federal firearms ban, and
discuss the possible efficacy of asserting equal protection and due process
claims.12 Finally, Part V discusses the potential implications of failure to
protect the rights of those who have been adjudicated as mentally ill and
concludes by summarizing this Comment’s proposed solutions.13
II. AMERICA’S HISTORY WITH MENTAL ILLNESS AND GUN CONTROL
Mental illness healthcare and gun control regulations have consistently
evolved throughout American history.14 Indeed, psychiatric hospitalization
procedures have transformed through increased understanding of mental
illness, social justice movements, and Supreme Court jurisprudence
attempting to preserve individual rights.15 Gun control legislation was born
out of times of crisis and has progressed in the face of public reaction to tragic
events.16 The colorful histories of these contentious, and often misunderstood,
subjects illustrate both the missteps and the positive developments America
has made in addressing mental illness and gun control.17
A. Involuntary Commitment
When an individual is subject to court-ordered psychiatric hospitalization
against their will, it is known as involuntary civil commitment, or simply
involuntary commitment.18 Involuntary commitment invokes two main
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Parts IV, V.
See infra Part V.
See infra Sections II.A, II.B.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Sections II.A, II.B.
See generally Megan Testa & Sara G. West, Civil Commitment in the United States,
PSYCHIATRY, Oct. 2010, at 30–38. When individuals voluntarily commit themselves, they may have
the option to check out against medical advice if their state laws permit, whereas an individual
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underlying legal principles: (1) the English common-law doctrine “parens
patriae” or “parent of the country,” which refers to assigning the government
responsibility to intervene on behalf of citizens who cannot act in their own
best interest, and (2) state police powers requiring a state to protect the interest
of its citizens.19 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
institutionalization in America drew no distinction between voluntary and
involuntary admissions to psychiatric institutions, and the loose standards of
civil commitment laws led to widespread abuse of commitment power.20
Importantly, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that, in addition to
exposing individuals to potential due process violations, involuntary civil
commitment is a deprivation of liberty partly because it creates “adverse
social consequences”: “Whether we label this phenomena ‘stigma’ or choose
to call it something else is less important than that we recognize that it can
occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the individual.”21 This
stigma marks a long history of the misunderstanding and mistreatment of
mentally ill or disabled individuals—and the accompanying violations of their
constitutional rights.22
For instance, in 1925, the Supreme Court decided the case Buck v. Bell,
in which Carrie Buck, an inmate at the Virginia Colony for Epileptics and
Feebleminded, alleged a state law allowing for the involuntary sterilization of
“mental defectives” violated her due process and equal protection rights.23
Tragically, the Court disagreed with Ms. Buck, holding that Virginia’s interest
in avoiding “being swamped with incompetence” was sufficiently important
to justify forced sterilization, and that neither Ms. Buck’s due process rights
nor her equal protection rights were violated.24 Even worse, the determination
involuntarily
committed
cannot.
Hospitalization,
MENTAL HEALTH AMERICA,
https://www.mhanational.org/hospitalization (last visited Feb. 9, 2022).
19. See Testa & West, supra note 18, at 31.
20. See id. at 32; Christyne E. Ferris, The Search for Due Process in Civil Commitment Hearings:
How Procedural Realities Have Altered Substantive Standards, 61 VAND. L. REV 959, 963 (2008).
Prior to the 1970s, in most states civil commitment merely required “findings” from two physicians
that the patient was “ill and a proper subject for treatment in a psychiatric hospital,” with no definition
of “ill” or “proper subject.” Ferris, supra. Patients often did not appear before a judge, and the
majority of states “did not provide counsel to indigent respondents.” Id. And when counsel was
present, these hearings were “characterized by mutual expectations of perfunctory performance,”
rather than meaningful advocacy. Id. As a result of these nebulous standards and inadequate
procedures, “hospitals became overcrowded with patients held on questionable grounds.” Id.
21. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425–26 (1979).
22. See Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1082 (2004).
23. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927).
24. See id. at 207. In reaching this decision, the Court applied rational basis review, the least
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of Ms. Buck’s “feeble-mindedness” was based on little more than the word of
her foster parents and the fact that her mother was institutionalized as well.25
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes penned the Court’s opinion, and the disdain
in his tone as he addressed Ms. Buck’s pleas for protection of both her body
and her constitutional rights not only evinced the early-twentieth-century
stigma that extends into today’s society but also set precedent for nearly a
century of mistreatment of the mentally ill.26 Notably, this decision was made
during the height of America’s early-twentieth-century eugenics movement
and resulted in the forced sterilization of as many as 70,000 individuals.27
Decades later, the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s sparked mentalhealth-law reforms providing for more deinstitutionalization and patients’
rights.28 Many states imposed laws shifting commitment power from medical
professionals to judges.29 While this change decreased the number of
unnecessary institutionalizations, it “put final commitment authority into the
restrictive standard of scrutiny. See id.
25. See id. at 205–07; Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck
v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 30–31 (1985). Ms. Carrie Buck’s mother, Emma, was incarcerated at
the Virginia Colony and was considered a “disgraced” woman for allegedly having Carrie out of
wedlock, despite records showing that Emma and Carrie’s father were married when she gave birth to
Carrie. See Lombardo, supra, at 52–53. Once committed, Emma was unable to care for Carrie, and
Carrie lived with foster parents, Mr. and Mrs. J.T. Dobbs, for fourteen years before her incarceration
at Virginia Colony. See id. at 53–54. Mrs. Dobbs’s nephew raped Carrie when she was sixteen years
old, impregnating her. See id. at 54. In a “desperate attempt to remove the embarrassment of a
pregnant but unwed girl from their home” and “save the family reputation,” the Dobbses suddenly
began claiming that Carrie had shown “symptoms of feeblemindedness” since she was ten or eleven
years old. Id. But Ms. Buck’s school records show that she was not mentally deficient; in fact, her
educators commented her work was “very good” and recommended she continue her education. See
id. at 52. Shortly before incarceration, Carrie gave birth to her daughter, Vivian, who was deemed
“not quite normal” at seven months old after a nurse observed her for a short period of time. See id.
at 61. Yet, in school, Vivian made Honor Roll. See id. Relying on the scant and seemingly inaccurate
information that had branded Emma Buck, Carrie Buck, and Vivian Buck as “degenerate,” Justice
Holmes sealed the fate of mental health stigma with his infamous remark that “[t]hree generations of
imbeciles are enough,” allowing the State of Virginia to cut Ms. Buck’s fallopian tubes against her
will. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207–08.
26. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 205–08. In addition to his infamous “[t]hree . . . imbeciles are enough”
quote, Holmes commented that “[i]t is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who
are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.” Id. at 207.
27. See The Supreme Court Ruling That Led to 70,000 Forced Sterilizations, NPR (Mar. 7, 2016,
1:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/03/07/469478098/the-supreme-courtruling-that-led-to-70-000-forcedsterilizations#:~:text=In%201927%2C%20the%20U.S.%20Supreme,deemed%20to%20be%20%22f
eebleminded.%22.
28. See Ferris, supra note 20, at 964.
29. See id.
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hands of legal professionals who often failed to understand the clinical aspects
of mental illness.”30 Doctors later resumed a “more prominent role”31 in
involuntary commitment hearings, and the Supreme Court even
acknowledged that “[w]hether [a person] is mentally ill . . . turns on the
meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and
psychologists.”32 While a step in the right direction, judges often blindly
agree with expert witnesses,33 and the Supreme Court noted that such hearings
often amount to little more that “time-consuming procedural minuets before
the admission.”34 Though the “supposed protections” of such proceedings
“may well be more illusory than real,” at the very least, the 1970s saw the law
shift toward more patient-friendly standards.35
In fact, in 1975, involuntary commitment shifted from a “need for
treatment” model to a “dangerousness” model, largely as a result of the
Supreme Court’s decision in O’Connor v. Donaldson.36 There, the Court held

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (emphasis omitted).
See Norman G. Poythress, Jr., Mental Health Expert Testimony: Current Problems, 5 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 201, 213 (1977). A study found that judges tend to rubber stamp state expert
witnesses’ recommendations in civil commitment hearings, agreeing with their testimony between
79% and 100% of the time. See id. Judges frequently “downplay the role of respondents’ attorneys
by discouraging them from . . . questioning witnesses,” so not only does the State have more resources
to provide experts, these experts are not adequately cross-examined to ensure legitimacy and accuracy.
Ferris, supra note 20, at 971. Even worse, there are “few controls on the discretion of doctors and
judges,” which has led to psychologists routinely misdiagnosing “perfectly sane people with serious
mental illnesses.” Samantha M. Caspar & Artem M. Joukov, Worse than Punishment: How the
Involuntary Commitment of Persons with Mental Illness Violates the United States Constitution, 47
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 499, 501 (2020).
34. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 605 (1979).
35. Id. at 609.
36. See Testa & West, supra note 18, at 32–34; O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); see
also Ferris, supra note 20, at 965 (explaining the shifts in involuntary treatment models). The “need
for treatment” model allowed for involuntary commitment based solely on the fact that the individual
was mentally ill, whereas the “dangerousness” model provides that to commit an individual, a state
must prove one of the “generally advanced” justifications: “a risk of harm to self or others, the inability
to care for oneself, or the need for treatment to cure a mental illness.” Ferris, supra note 20, at 965.
These justifications reveal that despite its namesake, dangerousness was likely only a sufficient, not
necessary condition for involuntary commitment under this model, as “need for treatment” did not
require dangerousness, and seemingly remained a sufficient justification. Id. But courts never
conclusively established whether the need for treatment alone was an adequate basis for involuntary
commitment under O’Connor, as the Supreme Court quickly collapsed the O’Connor standard in
Jones v. United States. See id. In Jones, the Court declared that “the Due Process Clause requires the
Government in a civil-commitment proceeding to demonstrate . . . that the individual is mentally ill
and dangerous,” effectively cementing dangerousness as a prerequisite to civil commitment. Jones v.
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that a finding of mental illness alone was insufficient to justify continuous
confinement; rather, “a [s]tate cannot constitutionally confine without more a
nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by
himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or
friends.”37 Shortly after O’Connor, every state either modified civil
commitment laws to incorporate the dangerousness component or
reinterpreted existing statutes to include dangerousness.38
The Court’s holding in O’Connor resulted from its application of strict
scrutiny, which allows a state government to infringe on a fundamental right
only if that infringement “is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.”39 Here, the fundamental right at stake was “every man’s
constitutional right to liberty.”40 And both state police powers to protect the
welfare of society and parens patriae interests in protecting an individual who
cannot protect themselves are considered compelling state interests.41 Thus,
the “dangerousness standard encompasses both of these justifications,
invoking the police power rationale when the state commits an individual who
is dangerous to others, and the parens patriae interest when the state commits
an individual who is dangerous to himself.”42
On the one hand, civil commitment is undoubtedly a necessary tool to aid
“[o]ne who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness and [is] in need of
treatment.”43 On the other, few recognize that those subject to civil
commitment do not necessarily fit the stereotype of a “mental patient.”44 For
instance, few recognize that voluntary commitment can rapidly evolve into

United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 (1983) (emphasis added).
37. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 576.
38. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND THE LIMITS
OF CHANGE 28 (1994).
39. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 573–76.
40. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 573.
41. See Ferris, supra note 20, at 966. States’ police powers and parens patriae interests
“traditionally justify intrusive state action.” Id. A seminal Supreme Court case establishing that
protecting public welfare and individuals who cannot protect themselves are compelling state interests
is Jacobson v. Massachusetts, where the Court held Massachusetts could mandate smallpox
vaccinations and fine those refusing to get vaccinated. 197 U.S. 11, 12–39 (1905).
42. Ferris, supra note 20, at 966 (italics omitted).
43. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
44. See Amir Garakani et al., Voluntary Psychiatric Hospitalization and Patient-Driven Requests
for Discharge: A Statutory Review and Analysis of Implications for the Capacity To Consent to
Voluntary Hospitalization, 22 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 241, 241 (2014); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 683–84 (6th Cir. 2016).
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involuntary commitment.45 In fact, upon voluntary psychiatric admission, the
“majority of states employ a [seventy-two]-hour period in which patients can
be held following a request for discharge from hospitalization,” and “after this
evaluation period, either the patient must be discharged, or the facility must
initiate involuntary commitment proceedings.”46
Thus, voluntary
commitment can turn into involuntary commitment, imposing the legal status
of court-ordered hospitalization on those who have sought treatment of their
own accord.47
Further, many do not realize that someone who does not suffer from
permanent mental illness, but rather temporary and understandable emotional
distress, may be subject to involuntary civil commitment.48 For example, in
Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department, the plaintiff was emotionally
devastated after his “wife of twenty-three years ran away with another man,
depleted [his] finances, and then served him with divorce papers.”49 Never
having seen their father so depressed, his teenage daughters contacted local
police, and the plaintiff was briefly involuntarily committed for
approximately two to four weeks to minimize any risk that he may become
suicidal.50 Subsequently, the plaintiff in Tyler never received any additional
mental health treatment, successfully held a job for nearly twenty years before
retiring, and remarried.51 Medical professionals reported that the plaintiff
showed “no signs of mental illness” and that his depression was nothing more
than a “brief reacti[on]” to his divorce and its surrounding circumstances.52
Nonetheless, the plaintiff is still subject to the restrictions, deprivations, and
stigma that resulted from his involuntary commitment.53
One such restriction is the federal firearms ban challenged by the plaintiff
in Tyler.54 While the ban is unquestionably necessary to protect public safety,
the federal government’s failure to provide adequate procedures for obtaining
relief from this ban illustrates the stigma surrounding mental illness in
American society and the deprivation of individual rights—namely equal

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
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protection and due process rights—that can occur as a result of state
involuntary civil commitment procedures.55 Further, it also illustrates
American society’s misunderstanding of mental illness and allows the
National Rifle Association (NRA) to further capitalize on their campaign to
use those receiving mental health care as scapegoats.56
In short, though the involuntary commitment system has made great
strides since its inception, it is still not a perfect system, and its shortcomings
have grave implications for the individual rights of those suffering from its
inadequacies.57
B. Early Gun Control Efforts and Mental Illness: From the Federal Gun
Control Act to the Brady Act
In the late 1960s, the federal government first addressed the need to
reform gun control laws to regulate mentally ill persons’ access to firearms.58
Concurrent with the evolution of involuntary commitment, and following the
assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy in April and
June of 1968, respectively, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent letters to each
state governor pressuring them to address gun control, stating:
I urge you again to review your gun control laws and to
speed work on the development of stringent legislation to
assure that deadly weapons are kept out of the hands of the
criminal, the demented, the alcoholic, and those too young
to bear the terrible responsibility of owning weapons of

55. See Becki Goggins & Anne Gallegos, State Progress in Record Reporting for Firearm-Related
Background Checks: Mental Health Submissions, NAT’L CTR. STATE CTS. 2–4 (Feb. 2016),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/249793.pdf.
56. See Lexington, Guns and the Mentally Ill: Why the NRA Keeps Talking About Mental Illness,
Rather than Guns, ECONOMIST (Mar. 13, 2013), https://www.economist.com/lexingtonsnotebook/2013/03/13/why-the-nra-keeps-talking-about-mental-illness-rather-than-guns. The NRA
“arguably wields far greater influence over national firearms policy than public opinion does” and has
“laid the blame for mass shootings on untreated mental illness—rather than unregulated guns.” Jeffrey
W. Swanson, Elizabeth McGinty, Seena Fazel & Vickie Mays, Mental Illness and Reduction of Gun
Violence and Suicide: Bringing Epidemiologic Research to Policy, 25 ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY 366,
366 (2015).
57. See Caspar & Joukov, supra note 33; Tyler, 837 F.3d at 683–84.
58. See generally Lyndon B. Johnson, Letters to the Governors on the Need for Improving State
Law Enforcement Systems and Gun Control Legislation, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 20, 1968),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/237043.
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destruction.59
A few months later, President Johnson signed the Gun Control Act of 1968,
creating the first law preventing “mental incompetents” from purchasing
firearms.60 Amending Title 18 of the United States Code “to provide for better
control of the interstate traffic in firearms,”61 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) “Persons
Adjudicated as a Mental Defective or Committed to a Mental Institution”
reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been
adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been
committed to a mental institution . . . to ship or transport in
interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any
firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.62
Section 922(g)(4) still stands today.63 Further, federal regulations clarify that
“[c]ommitted to a mental institution” refers to “a formal [involuntary]
commitment” and that the prohibition does not apply to “a person in a mental

59. Id.
60. See Olivia B. Waxman, How the Gun Control Act of 1968 Changed America’s Approach to
Firearms—And What People Get Wrong About That History, TIME, https://time.com/5429002/guncontrol-act-history-1968/ (Oct. 30, 2018, 11:52 AM).
61. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, 1213 (1968). See generally 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).
62. § 922(g)(4); see also Federal Firearms Prohibition Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4): Persons
Adjudicated as a Mental Defective or Committed to a Mental Institution, BUREAU ALCOHOL,
TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, https://www.atf.gov/file/58791/download (May 2009) (defining
“adjudicated as a mental defective”). Someone has been “adjudicated as a mental defective if a court,
board, commission, or other lawful authority has made a determination that the person, as a result of
marked subnormal intelligence, mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease”: (1) “[i]s a danger
to himself or to others”; (2) “[l]acks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs”; (3)
“[i]s found insane by a court in a criminal case”; or (4) “[i]s found incompetent to stand trial, or not
guilty by reason of lack of mental responsibility.” Federal Firearms Prohibition Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(4): Persons Adjudicated as a Mental Defective or Committed to a Mental Institution, supra.
A person is “committed to a mental institution” if that person has been formally
committed to a mental institution by a court, board, commission, or other lawful
authority. The term includes a commitment: [t]o a mental institution
involuntarily; [f]or mental defectiveness or mental illness; or [f]or other
reasons, such as drug use.
Id.
63. See § 922(g)(4).
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institution for observation or a voluntary admission to a mental institution.”64
Yet, Congress never defined the word “commitment,” and to this day, various
courts have adopted different approaches to its interpretation.65
For instance, courts unanimously agree that commitment must be
involuntary to trigger the Gun Control Act but disagree as to whether
“temporary involuntary hospitalization without a formal hearing satisfies the
Act’s commitment requirement.”66 Additionally, courts diverge on whether
to defer to state legislatures’ involuntary commitment statutes, with some
courts carefully examining such statutes and some creating a “federal
definition . . . that is not informed by the state’s intent or word choice.”67
Finally, while courts agree that Congress intended to keep dangerous
individuals from obtaining firearms, they disagree on whether Congress “only
intended to prohibit gun possession by people whom a state had formally
committed to a mental institution,” or instead “broadly intended to prevent
gun possession by anyone whom a state had placed involuntarily in a mental
institution regardless of the patient’s opportunity for a hearing or the purpose
of the confinement.”68 These varying interpretations illustrate how
ambiguous the language of § 922(g)(4) is and the need for Congress or the
Supreme Court to clarify various aspects of the statute.69
Thirteen years after the passage of § 922(g)(4), the ability of the mentally
ill to obtain firearms once again became a hot-button topic in the United States
following the Hinckley verdict, where a jury found John Hinckley not guilty
by reason of insanity after he attempted to assassinate President Ronald
Reagan using a handgun.70 Shortly after, the Supreme Court clarified
64. 27 C.F.R. § 478.11.
65. See Sohrab Zahedi, Robert Burchuk, David C. Stone & Alex Kopelowicz, Gun Laws and the
Involuntarily Committed: A California Road Map, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 545, 547
(2009).
66. Clare Priest, When a Stopgap Measure Triggers a Permanent Proscription: The Interpretation
of “Committed to a Mental Institution” in the Gun Control Act of 1968, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 359, 360–
61 (2002).
67. See id. at 361.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 360–61.
70. See Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental Illness and
Criminal Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 7, 24 (2007). Hinckley was
obsessed with Jodie Foster, an actress who starred in the movie Taxi Driver, where the protagonist
plans to assassinate a presidential candidate. See id.; Natalie Jacewicz, After Hinckley, States
Tightened Use of the Insanity Plea, NPR (July 28, 2016, 10:20 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/07/28/486607183/after-hinckley-states-tighteneduse-of-the-insanity-plea. Hinckley had repeatedly called and sent letters to Foster, and many believe
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standards for commitment in Jones v. United States, announcing that “the Due
Process Clause requires the Government in a civil-commitment proceeding to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally
ill and dangerous.”71 The Court’s cementing of a heightened bar for
involuntary commitment marked both its reaction to public outcry72 and its
acknowledgement that individual rights—namely the right to due process of
law—may be compromised by involuntary commitment.73
Over ten years later, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993
was signed into law, influenced by the harm inflicted on President Reagan’s
White House Press Secretary, James Brady, who was shot in the head and
suffered paralysis as a result of Hinckley’s attempted assassination of
Reagan.74 The Act “required the U.S. Attorney General to establish the
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).”75 Federal
Firearms Licensees must request background checks on those seeking
firearms, and if the NICS index provides records showing an individual has
been adjudicated as mentally defective or committed to a mental institution
his attempt to assassinate Reagan was a bid for the actress’s attention. See Jacewicz, supra. Using
this, and other evidence of Hinckley’s mental health, Hinckley’s defense attorneys successfully argued
that he could not be held responsible for the assassination attempt because he was suffering from
schizophrenia and a major depressive disorder when it occurred. See id.
71. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 (1983).
72. Id. The public immediately reacted negatively to the Hinckley verdict, and the very next day
“the Delaware legislature passed a law providing a Guilty But Mentally Ill verdict alternative in
insanity cases.” Valerie P. Hans & Dan Slater, John Hinckley, Jr. and the Insanity Defense: The
Public’s Verdict, 334 CORNELL L. FAC. PUB’NS 202, 202–03 (1983). Congress and other states
quickly followed Delaware’s lead, either abolishing the insanity defense altogether or creating stricter
rules to govern it. See Jacewicz, supra note 70. While much of this public outcry stemmed from the
public’s disdain for Hinckley, it evinced a much larger issue—the public’s misconception that the
insanity defense was frequently, and successfully, used. See id. Tellingly, a 1981 study showed people
believed that the insanity defense was raised in 43% percent of cases, when in reality, the defense was
raised in less than 1% of cases, and over the study’s two-year period, only resulted in a single acquittal.
See id. Indeed, America’s cumulative response to Hinckley’s acquittal likely resulted largely from the
inaccurate belief that achieving acquittal via the insanity defense was an easy task. See id. Raising
the bar for the insanity defense appeased the public’s misplaced concern and made it much harder for
those suffering from mental illness to prove such a defense when genuinely applicable. See id.
73. See generally Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425–26 (1979) (“[O]nly one state by statute
permits involuntary commitment by a mere preponderance of the evidence . . . , and Texas is the only
state where a court has concluded that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard satisfies due
process.”).
74. See Brady Law, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Brady-Law (last visited Feb.
11, 2022); The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536
(1993).
75. National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), U.S. DEP’T JUST. (May 2015),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/nics/general-information/nics-overview-brochure.
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per § 922(g)(4), that individual cannot obtain a firearm.76 While this program
proved effective in lowering the number of mentally ill individuals who could
legally access firearms, later, some glaring gaps in its efficacy came to light
and sparked new reform.77
Though it is promising that the legislature has responded to public safety
issues with much-needed gun control reform, the repeated need for reform
illustrates that legislators must remain vigilant as society evolves and new
firearm-related dangers arise.78 Further, these reforms provide ample opportunity for the legislature to more effectively address public safety issues while
simultaneously ensuring the statutory schemes for gun control are tailored to
safeguard important individual rights.79
III. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RELIEF FROM DISABILITIES: WHERE WE
STAND AND HOW WE GOT HERE
It is important to note that federal firearms bans are not necessarily a
complete bar to obtaining a firearm.80 Section 922(g)(4) and the statutory
scheme for obtaining relief, however, have been challenged as
unconstitutional since their inception and, despite their evolution, continue to
face such challenges today.81 An examination of the history of relief statutes,
pre-Heller adjudication, Heller itself, and the § 922(g)(4) circuit split reveals
the current state of individual rights as they relate to the federal firearms ban,
and the path that got us here.82
A. The Failure of § 925(c) as a Road to Relief
Interestingly, prior to 1986, only “felons who ha[d] committed crimes not
involving firearms [could] apply to the [ATF] for administrative relief from
[the federal firearms ban]. No such relief [was] permitted for former mental
76. See id.
77. See NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–180, § 2(9), 121 Stat.
2559, 2560 (2008); infra Section III.C (discussing legislative reform addressing the shortcomings of
NICS).
78. See Johnson, supra note 58; Waxman, supra note 60; NICS Improvement Amendments Act
§ 2(9).
79. See Lexington, supra note 56.
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(c); 34 U.S.C. § 40915.
81. See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Galioto, 477 U.S. 556,
558 (1986).
82. See infra Sections III.A, III.B, III.C.
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patients.”83 In 1982, former mental patient, Anthony J. Galioto, brought an
equal protection claim challenging the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 925(c),
the statute allowing felons to petition for relief.84 The district court found that
§ 925(c)’s failure to include former mental patients violated equal protection
principles because “[t]here is no rational basis for thus singling out mental
patients for permanent disabled status, particularly as compared to convicts.”85
The district court further concluded that § 925(c) was unconstitutional
because it “in effect create[d] an irrebuttable presumption that one who has
been committed, no matter the circumstances, is forever mentally ill and
dangerous.”86 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and the case was argued
on March 26, 1986.87 Shortly after, on May 19, 1986, President Reagan signed
the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act into law, amending § 925(c) “by striking
out the language limiting the provision to certain felons.”88 Then, on June 27,
1986, the Supreme Court issued an opinion declaring Galioto’s equal
protection claim moot and vacating the district court’s judgment.89
The Firearms Owners’ Protection Act’s revision of § 925(c) “extended to
persons who had been involuntarily committed to a mental institution” the
ability to petition for relief from the federal firearms ban.90 From 1986 to
1992, federal law provided this relief-from-disabilities program for felons and
those adjudicated as mentally ill, with the amended § 925(c) stating:
A person who is prohibited from possessing, shipping,
transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition may make
application to the Attorney General for relief from the
disabilities imposed by [f]ederal laws with respect to the
acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, transportation, or
possession of firearms, and the Attorney General may grant
such relief if it is established to his satisfaction that the
circumstances regarding the disability, and the applicant’s
83. Galioto, 477 U.S. at 558.
84. See id. at 558.
85. Id. at 559 (quoting Galioto v. Dep’t of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 602
F. Supp. 682, 689 (D.N.J. 1985)).
86. Id. (quoting Galioto, 602 F. Supp. at 690).
87. See id.
88. Id.; see Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99–308, § 105, 100 Stat. 449, 459
(1986).
89. See Galioto, 477 U.S. at 559–60.
90. Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2020); see Firearms Owners’ Protection
Act § 105.
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record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be
likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that
the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public
interest. Any person whose application for relief from
disabilities is denied by the Attorney General may file a
petition with the United States district court for the district
in which he resides for a judicial review of such denial. The
court may in its discretion admit additional evidence where
failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.91
In an effort to appropriately designate the authority to administer the relieffrom-disabilities program, the director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) was placed in control of making such
decisions.92 But a mere six years later, Congress “prohibited the use of funds
‘to investigate or act upon applications for relief from [f]ederal firearms
disabilities under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).’”93 Congress justified defunding the
program by arguing that reviewing applications was “a very difficult and
subjective task which could have devastating consequences for innocent
citizens if the wrong decision is made.”94

91. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). In other words, someone subject to the federal firearms ban could petition
for relief, and the Attorney General would lift the ban if the petitioner provided sufficient evidence
that their owning a firearm would not pose a danger to society. See id.
92. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.130(a)(1); 27 C.F.R. § 478.144(b).
93. Mai, 952 F.3d at 1111 (quoting United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 75 (2002)).
94. S. REP. NO. 102–353, at 19 (1992). Because § 922(g)(4) bans felons from owning firearms,
§ 925 requires the ATF to assess felons’ petitions for relief from the federal firearms ban. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(4), 925(c).
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B. Pre-Heller § 922(g)(4) Adjudication
While this Comment will clarify how Heller has served to complicate
challenges to firearm prohibitions, it is important to note that other plaintiffs
accused § 922(g)(4) of being unconstitutional prior to the Court’s seminal
Second Amendment decision.95 In the 1971 case United States v. Buffaloe,
the plaintiff challenged his conviction for violating § 922(g)(4)96 by stating he
had “never been adjudicated a mental defective or committed to a mental
institution” in order to purchase two pistols.97 Previously, the plaintiff,
Buffaloe, had been found not guilty by reason of insanity under Virginia state
law for maiming and was involuntarily committed as criminally insane.98
Because he was discharged from the hospital sixteen months after
commitment as “not . . . insane or feebleminded,” Buffaloe argued to the
Fourth Circuit that § 922(g)(4)’s application to him was unconstitutional.99
The Fourth Circuit found this argument unconvincing and affirmed the district
court’s judgment, holding that the statute’s application to Buffaloe was
constitutional.100
Over a decade later, the Tenth Circuit heard Redford v. U.S. Department
of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in 1982.101 The
plaintiff, Redford, argued that the term “mentally incompetent” was
“unconstitutionally vague” because it was undefined by federal statute and
that the firearm ban’s application to him was unconstitutional because he was
allegedly no longer mentally incompetent.102 Previously, in 1974, Redford
was found not guilty by reason of insanity on an assault charge and committed
to a state hospital until he was conditionally released a little over a year later
and absolutely released about a year after that.103 Later, in 1979, Redford was
95. See Zahedi et al., supra note 65.
96. See § 922(g)(4). At the time, what is now 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) was included in 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(d)(4) but, here, is referred to by its modern code section for clarity. See § 922.
97. United States v. Buffaloe, 449 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id. Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit’s opinion fails to state which constitutional rights
Buffaloe alleged the application of § 922(g)(4) violated. See id. Since the Supreme Court had yet to
find there was a Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, presumably Buffaloe brought his
claims on other grounds—perhaps due process and equal protection. See id.; District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
101. Redford v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 691 F.2d 471
(10th Cir. 1982).
102. See id. at 473.
103. See id. at 472.
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arrested for harassing his housekeeper.104 Though the charges were dismissed,
the housekeeper revealed Redford possessed numerous weapons, and
investigating officers seized Redford’s eighteen firearms.105 Subsequently, an
ATF agent permanently seized the weapons pursuant to § 922(g)(4)’s106
penalty provisions.107 After Redford failed to timely file a claim for their
return, the weapons were declared forfeited to the government, and Redford
then filed his claim alleging § 922(g)(4) violated the Constitution.108
The Tenth Circuit found that the statute was not unconstitutional on
vagueness grounds because someone “in Redford’s position would reasonably
understand that the statute applied to them.”109 The court further held that the
prohibition’s application to Redford was constitutional in the absence of
express “exceptions for people who have regained their competency or
sanity.”110 Thus, even in light of the Second Amendment’s rapid evolution
subsequent to these cases, both Redford and Buffaloe “serve as precedent case
law in support of continued federal firearms prohibition,” even when the
individual has been adjudicated as sane after release.111
C. Heller & the Circuit Split
Briefly returning to the Brady Handgun Act for context, nearly fifteen
years after its enactment, the failure to properly enforce the statute enabled
the Virginia Tech shooter, who had “a proven history of mental illness,”112 to
“purchase firearms from [a Federal Firearms Licensee] because information

104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). At the time, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4)’s penalty provisions were set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) and 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(3) but, here, are referred to as § 922(g)(4)’s
penalty provisions for simplicity. See § 922(g)(4).
107. See Redford, 691 F.2d at 472–73.
108. See id. at 473.
109. Id.
110. Id. The court clarified that for purposes of the federal firearms ban, those who have been found
not guilty by reason of insanity and subsequently hospitalized qualify as “adjudicated mentally
incompetent.” Id. Redford also asserted a Fifth Amendment takings claim, asserting that “the district
court should have ordered the government to compensate him for the firearms it seized.” Id. But the
court disregarded this claim, noting “it has long been settled that if the government acts pursuant to a
forfeiture statute, it may seize personal property without compensating the owner.” Id.
111. Zahedi et al., supra note 65, at 547.
112. NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–180, § 2(9), 121 Stat. 2559,
2560 (2008). “Improved coordination between State and Federal authorities could have ensured that
the shooter’s disqualifying mental health information was available to NICS.” Id.
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about his prohibiting mental health history was not available to the NICS, and
the system was therefore unable to deny the transfer of the firearms used in
the shootings.”113 In the wake of this tragedy, Congress signed the NICS
Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (NIAA) into law in early 2008,
“seek[ing] to address gaps in information available to NICS about such
prohibiting mental health adjudications and commitments.”114 In an attempt
to please all crowds, the NIAA included 34 U.S.C. § 40915.115 Under
§ 40915, a state can grant citizens relief from the firearms ban if it has a state
relief program that fulfills § 40915’s requirements.116 States are required to
create these relief-from-disabilities programs in order to receive federal
funds.117 Notably, and likely not coincidentally,118 the Supreme Court granted
113. NICS Act Record Improvement Program, BUREAU JUST. STATS. (Mar. 3, 2021),
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=49.
114. Id.; see NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 § 2.
115. See 34 U.S.C. § 40915.
116. See NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 § 105(a), 121 Stat. at 2569–70.
117. See Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 697 (6th Cir. 2016). Currently,
around thirty states and one Native American tribe have such qualifying programs. See State Profiles:
NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP) Awards FY 2009–2020, supra note 5.
118. See Adam Liptak, Carefully Plotted Course Propels Gun Case to Top, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/03/us/03bar.html.
Robert Levy, a libertarian who
interestingly has never owned a gun in his life, planned and personally financed the plaintiffs’ position
in Heller. See id. Levy is a constitutional scholar and modeled his plan after Thurgood Marshall’s
manufactured litigation that resulted in the Supreme Court overturning school segregation. See id.
Levy, along with attorneys Alan Gura and Clark Neily, carefully vetted potential plaintiffs for their
lawsuit, settling on a cast of six ideal individuals who are diverse in race, gender, sexual orientation,
age, and economic status. See Paul Duggan, Lawyer Who Wiped Out D.C. Ban Says It’s About
Liberties, Not Guns, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2007), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/03/17/AR2007031701055.html. The suit was filed in 2003 and did not make
it up to the Supreme Court until 2007. See Parker v. Dist. of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C.
2004). The Supreme Court receives approximately 10,000 petitions for writ of certiorari per year and
follows the “Rule of Four,” providing that if four Justices feel a case has value, they will issue a writ
of certiorari, or a legal order for the lower court to send the case records to the Court for review. See
The U.S. Supreme Court, JUD. LEARNING CTR., https://judiciallearningcenter.org/the-us-supremecourt/#:~:text=The%20Supreme%20Court%20receives%20about,issue%20a%20writ%20of%20certi
orari.&text=When%20all%20is%20said%20and,75%2D85%20cases%20a%20year (last visited Feb.
11, 2022). The Court hears approximately seventy-five to eighty-five cases per year and often chooses
“cases that will have a large constitutional impact, or that answer important legal questions that affect
the whole nation.” Id. Given the social unrest surrounding gun control in the months prior to the
Court’s granting certiorari, it follows that the Court saw Heller as an opportunity to address a hotbutton area of the law riddled with unanswered questions. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570 (2008). What is more, given that the Heller majority consisted of the Court’s conservative
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, along with the two swing-vote (but often right-leaning) Justices
Roberts and Kennedy, it is likely that the conservative bloc of the Court capitalized on the opportunity
to redefine the Second Amendment as containing an individual right to own a firearm in somewhat of
a retaliatory move in light of new gun control legislation. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
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certiorari to District of Columbia v. Heller in late 2007, issuing its opinion on
the case on June 26, 2008, only a few months after the NIAA was signed into
law.119 Closely following NIAA’s enactment, Heller marked a dramatic shift
in Second Amendment jurisprudence.120
In Heller, the Supreme Court addressed whether the District of
Columbia’s prohibition on the possession of usable handguns in the home
violates the Second Amendment, which required the Court to determine
whether the Second Amendment creates an individual right to keep and bear
arms.121 In a majority opinion penned by Justice Scalia, the Court held that
the Second Amendment does create an individual right to keep and bear arms,
stating that “[t]he prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia
was the only reason Americans valued the ancient right; most [Americans]
undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defense and hunting” and
that “the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second
Amendment right.”122
119. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 573.
120. See id. at 595.
121. See id. at 573. The Second Amendment reads: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S.
CONST. amend. II.
122. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599, 628. Both the plain text of the Second Amendment and its historical
context indicate that preserving the militia was likely the only purpose of the Second Amendment.
Zoom Interview with Barry McDonald, Professor of Law, Pepperdine Caruso School of Law (Mar. 3,
2021). Ironically enough, Justice Scalia was widely known as a textualist and originalist. See Max
Alderman & Duncan Pickard, Justice Scalia’s Heir Apparent?: Judge Gorsuch’s Approach to
Textualism and Originalism, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 185, 185 (2017). Read as a whole, the text of
the Second Amendment conveys a right for Americans to own guns to preserve state militias, and that
Justice Scalia had to perform such linguistic gymnastics to achieve his desired outcome serves only to
show that the plain text in its entirety works against Justice Scalia’s desires. See Heller, 554 U.S. at
598–606; Zoom Interview with Barry McDonald, Professor of Law, Pepperdine Caruso School of Law
(Mar. 3, 2021) (explaining the “accurate originalist and textualist interpretation of the Second
Amendment”). Further, Justice Scalia also attempted to use originalism to mold the Second
Amendment to his preferred outcome by imputing the assumption that “most [people] undoubtedly
thought [the right to bear arms] even more important for self-defense and hunting” at the time of the
Second Amendment’s drafting, while completely avoiding any legitimate evidence of the Framers’
intent. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599. James Madison cobbled together the Second Amendment using the
text of state constitutions, and given that the Bill of Rights was intended to restrain the federal
government’s power, it is widely understood that the Second Amendment was meant to allow each
state to preserve a militia in order to defend themselves from federal forces if need be. Zoom Interview
with Barry McDonald, Professor of Law, Pepperdine Caruso School of Law (Mar. 3, 2021). Heller is
an excellent illustration of the Court’s unfortunate tendency to reverse-engineer its opinions by
electing an outcome and then interpreting the law to achieve that end. See id. (discussing the intended
outcome of Heller). Nonetheless, regardless of whether the Second Amendment actually does confer
an individual right, if the Supreme Court insists it does, courts must be faithful to that interpretation
and protect it to the same extent they protect other individual rights, though lower courts’ unique
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Attempting to modestly narrow the scope of the right, Justice Scalia’s
opinion specified that the Second Amendment protects the “right of lawabiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”123
What is more, the Court clarified that, “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by
the Second Amendment is not unlimited” and that nothing in the Heller
opinion “should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial
sale of arms.”124 The Court categorized these bans as “presumptively lawful,”
later clarifying that they are outside of the scope of the Second Amendment’s
protections and, thus, immune from Second Amendment claims.125 One
aspect of Heller that has drawn much criticism is its failure to address the full
scope of the Second Amendment, including the standard of review for
evaluating Second Amendment claims.126 The majority acknowledged that its
opinion left some issues unanswered, specifically pointing out that it
intentionally “declin[ed] to establish a level of scrutiny for evaluating Second
Amendment restrictions.”127
methodology regarding the Second Amendment will be discussed later. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 598–
606.
123. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
124. Id. at 626–27.
125. See id. at 627 n.26; see also Beers v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2758 (2020) (remanding a claim that
§ 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional with instructions to dismiss the case as moot because, with respect to
the facts at issue, the statute is “presumptively lawful” and, thus, outside the scope of Second
Amendment protections).
126. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 634 (majority opinion). Justice Scalia cleverly declined to classify Second Amendment
rights as fundamental because then any laws infringing on the right to own a gun in the home would
be subject to strict scrutiny. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding
fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (same). Strict
scrutiny has been referred to as “strict in theory, but fatal in fact,” because few laws pass the
requirement that the government have a compelling interest for the law and that the law be the only
way to achieve that interest. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring). Thus, it follows that if the Court declared the right to own firearms a fundamental right,
most laws regulating gun ownership would be struck down. See id. In McDonald v. City of Chicago
only two years after Heller, the Court promoted the right to bear arms to a fundamental right and
incorporated it to apply against the states through the liberty provision of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause. 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). This only further ignited what has become an absolute
dumpster fire of an area of the law, and lower courts have persistently refused to treat Second
Amendment rights as they do other fundamental rights. See Sarah Herman Peck, Post-Heller Second
Amendment Jurisprudence, CONG. RSCH. SERV. 1–2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44618.pdf (Mar.
25, 2019). In fact, the Sixth Circuit even remarked that the two-step approach to Second Amendment
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The Court’s opinion had a major impact on future Second Amendment
cases because, prior to Heller, the majority of lower federal courts adhered to
the “collective right theory,” interpreting the Second Amendment as
providing the states with a collective right to maintain militias.128 After
Heller, however, lower courts had to determine how to address Second
Amendment claims given the Court’s new “individual right theory” of the
Second Amendment.129 One clear point is that when a challenged regulation
falls within the “presumptively lawful” category delineated in Heller (i.e.,
those addressing firearm possession by felons, the mentally ill, or general
possession in sensitive areas), “a court does not need to apply a particular level
of scrutiny in reviewing the restriction because the law does not facially
violate the Second Amendment.”130 Thus, post-Heller, courts usually spend
little to no energy on evaluating the constitutionality of such restrictions and
often uphold them, so long as they are “longstanding prohibitions” or fall into
one of the “presumptively lawful” categories the Court listed in Heller.131
Unsurprisingly, then, federal laws preventing those who have been
adjudicated as mentally ill from obtaining firearms—namely § 922(g)(4)—
fall into the “presumptively lawful” category.132 This statute, however, is an
“indefinite gun ownership prohibition”133 and fails to address whether its
restrictions apply to those who are no longer mentally ill; thus, there are
limited options for those who are now in good mental health, do not pose a
danger to society, and wish to legally obtain a firearm.134 Heller’s
establishment of an individual right to own a firearm has created a flood of
claims that many courts have adopted “bears an uncertain relationship” with Heller’s dictum. See
Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 689–90 (6th Cir. 2016).
128. See Peck, supra note 127, at 14.
129. See id. at 4.
130. Id. at summary. Otherwise, courts have generally applied a two-step framework to evaluate
Second Amendment claims: First, courts ask whether the regulated person, firearm, or place comes
within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protections. See id. If it does, then courts ask “whether
the challenged law burdens core Second Amendment conduct, like the ability to use a firearm for selfdefense in the home,” in order to determine what level of scrutiny to apply. Id. If Second Amendment
activity is “substantially burden[ed],” courts apply strict scrutiny, otherwise—and most frequently—
courts apply intermediate scrutiny. See id.
131. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 627 n.26. In addition to the categories mentioned, the Court noted
that “sensitive places” include schools and government buildings and that “laws imposing conditions
and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms” are presumptively lawful as well. Id. at 626–27.
132. See id.
133. Zahedi et al., supra note 65, at 546. In contrast, states like California place a time-limited
statutory firearm ban on those who have been involuntarily committed. See id. The individual may
petition for relief from the ban five years after release. See id.
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).
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Second Amendment claims, and the circuits have split over those challenging
the constitutionality of § 922(g)(4) as applied to fully recovered individuals.135
D. The Third Circuit: Binderup and Beers
In 2016, in Binderup v. Attorney General United States of America, the
Third Circuit established a framework requiring challengers to federal firearm
prohibitions to “(1) identify the traditional justifications for excluding from
Second Amendment protections the class of which he appears to be a member,
and then (2) present facts about himself and his background that distinguish
his circumstances from those of persons in the historically barred class.”136
The court further noted that “[t]here is no historical support for the view that
the passage of time or evidence of rehabilitation can restore Second
Amendment rights that were forfeited.”137
Applying the Binderup framework in a later case, the Third Circuit
rejected the plaintiff’s claim in Beers v. Attorney General United States.138 In
2005, plaintiff Beers was involuntarily committed for less than two months
after disclosing suicidal ideations to his mother, who was “particularly
concerned” because Beers owned a gun.139 In 2013, seven years after Beers’s
release, a physician examining Beers stated that Beers was able “to safely
handle firearms again without risk of harm to himself or others.”140 In
analyzing Beers’s subsequent claim that the federal firearms ban was
unconstitutional as applied to him given his return to good mental health, the
court first stated that § 922(g)(4) did not substantially burden any rights
protected by the Second Amendment, so heightened scrutiny need not
apply.141 It then concluded that based on both the underlying policy reasons
for § 922(g)(4) and the Binderup framework, Beers could only prevail if he

135. See generally Beers v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 927 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2019) (analyzing a Second
Amendment claim under the Binderup framework and intermediate scrutiny); Mai v. United States,
952 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir. 2020) (analyzing a Second Amendment claim under intermediate
scrutiny only).
136. Binderup v. Att’y Gen. U.S. of Am., 836 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
137. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 350.
138. See Beers, 927 F.3d at 159.
139. See id. at 152.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 157. In Beers, the Third Circuit noted that, in United States v. Barton, the court
“determined that, even though felon dispossession statutes were presumptively lawful under Heller,
§ 922(g)(1) could still be challenged as it applied to individuals.” Id. at 154–55; see also United States
v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2011), overruled by Binderup, 836 F.3d at 336.
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could show “that he was never determined to be a danger to himself or to
others.”142 Beers could not do so, and the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision to uphold the § 922(g)(4) firearms ban.143
Then on July 1, 2019, only eleven days after the Third Circuit issued its
opinion in Beers, the “ATF released a ‘Certification of Qualifying State Relief
from Disabilities Program’ . . . approving Pennsylvania’s relief scheme.”144
Thus, Pennsylvania, Beers’s state of residence, became one of approximately
thirty states that has a state relief program fulfilling § 40915’s requirements—
meaning that Pennsylvania accepts federal funding and in exchange, has a
program allowing it to grant its citizens relief from § 922(g)(4).145 With the
eradication of the federal relief-from-disabilities program under § 925(c),
state programs like Pennsylvania’s serve as the only route to relief from
§ 922(g)(4).146 Consequently, in May of 2020, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the Third Circuit with
instructions to dismiss the case as moot because Beers was “covered by this
policy change and is now licensed to possess a firearm and has obtained
one.”147
Notably, the Third Circuit’s opinion, though vacated, evinced an
142. Beers, 927 F.3d at 159.
143. See id.
144. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23, Beers v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2758 (2020) (No. 19-864); see
Justin McShane, Restoring Your Gun Rights in PA After a 302 Commitment, PA. L. ABIDING GUN
OWNER BLOG (2019), https://www.pennlago.com/restoring-your-gun-rights-in-pa-after-a-302commitment/#:~:text=In%20a%20positive%20turn%20of,from%20Disabilities%20under%2018%2
0Pa.
145. See State Profiles: NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP) Awards FY 2009–2020,
supra note 5.
146. See S. REP. NO. 102–353, at 19 (1992); 34 U.S.C. § 40915.
147. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 144, at 23; Beers, 140 S. Ct. at 2579. It is
important to note that when the Supreme Court remanded this case with directions to dismiss the claim
as moot, the opinion contained no reasoning. See Beers, 140 S. Ct. at 2579. This Comment interprets
the failure to set forth any reasoning as holding Beers’s claim was moot due to his obtaining a firearm
because a central argument in his petition for writ of certiorari was that his doing so did not moot his
claim under the voluntary cessation doctrine. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 144, at
24–25. The fact that Beers was able to obtain relief from § 922(g)(4) illustrates the inadequacy of the
Third Circuit’s approach to assessing these claims, as they deemed him ineligible for relief while
federal law deemed him eligible. See Beers v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 927 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2019).
This discord in standards could be addressed by legislative reform, or alternatively, circuit courts
taking a uniform approach to assessing these claims. See infra Sections IV.B, IV.C. Interestingly,
Beers is actually the second case where the mootness doctrine provided the Court the opportunity to
dodge addressing the constitutionality of the federal firearms ban as applied to those adjudicated as
mentally ill; Galioto was the first. See Beers, 140 S. Ct. at 2578–59; U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Galioto, 477 U.S. 556, 558 (1986).
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understanding of the social implications of § 922(g)(4)’s application, stating
that “[n]othing in our opinion should be read as perpetuating the stigma
surrounding mental illness. Although Beers may now be rehabilitated, we do
not consider this fact in the context of the very circumscribed, historical
inquiry we must conduct.”148 Interestingly, the Third Circuit noted that “Beers
also asserted due process and equal protection violation[]” claims, which
“were not raised on appeal.”149 Though the Third Circuit did not explicitly
address the merits of Beers’s due process and equal protection claims, it is
possible that such claims were not raised on appeal because they were
coextensive with Beers’s Second Amendment claim.150
E. The Sixth Circuit: Tyler
In 2016, the Sixth Circuit followed the lower court trend of blatantly

148. Beers, 927 F.3d at 159.
149. See id. at 153 n.6.
150. See id. at 153. If these claims were not raised on appeal because they were considered
coextensive with Beers’s Second Amendment claim, this may conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s dicta
in Mai. See Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2020). Under the Court’s equal
protection framework, one can assert an equal protection claim arguing discrimination as to the
exercise of a fundamental right. See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Further, given
that the Court has allowed plaintiffs to assert equal protection claims as to the exercise of rights
deemed fundamental under the Court’s substantive due process framework, it follows that equal
protection claims can be asserted as to any fundamental right, including the Second Amendment right
to own and bear arms. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding discrimination
as to the exercise of a fundamental right violated equal protection principles); Skinner v. State of
Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 315 U.S. 789 (1942) (same). Generally, these equal protection claims
warrant strict scrutiny, but given that the Second Amendment protects the right to bear arms, if the
Supreme Court were to face an equal protection claim on the fundamental right to bear arms grounds,
it would likely swat the equal protection claim aside and assess it as only a Second Amendment claim.
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Notably, individuals can also bring equal protection
claims on the basis that they are being discriminated against due to the class they are part of. See
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). This
will be discussed in greater detail in Section IV.C. Furthermore, under the Court’s procedural due
process framework, when a plaintiff has a cognizable property interest grounded in positive law—
here, the right to possess a firearm for self-defense in the home—the Court assesses the importance of
the private interest affected, the adequacy of existing procedures in preventing erroneous deprivation,
and the burden on the government of providing additional procedures. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 332–35 (1976). Here, a procedural due process analysis may diverge from the normal
routine because it could be argued that there is no cognizable property interest at issue, given that
§ 922(g)(4) falls within Heller’s “presumptively lawful” category. See District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). The Court’s recent reversal of Beers indicates this may be its current
stance—that if the prohibition is presumptively lawful, there is no property right to be assessed at all.
See Beers, 140 S. Ct. at 2758–59.
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deviating from the Supreme Court’s holding in McDonald151 and applied
intermediate scrutiny to the plaintiff’s claim in Tyler v. Hillsdale County
Sheriff’s Department.152 As previously discussed, Tyler was briefly
involuntarily committed following an emotional divorce and showed no signs
of mental illness in the years following his release.153 The court in Tyler held
that the federal government failed to show that there was a substantial
relationship between § 922(g)(4) and the policy purposes of suicide
prevention and crime reduction, and thus, the statute violated the plaintiff’s
Second Amendment rights.154 In addressing Heller, the Sixth Circuit
remarked that “Heller’s ‘presumptively lawful’ dictum”155 did not foreclose
constitutional scrutiny and that the Sixth Circuit was electing to follow the
Seventh Circuit regarding the “presumptive lawfulness of longstanding bans
[a]s precautionary, not conclusive.”156
151. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010). As previously noted, in
McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court held the right to keep and bear arms is “fundamental
to our scheme of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” thus,
statutes restricting the core of the Second Amendment should be subject to strict scrutiny based on the
Court’s usual treatment of fundamental rights. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
721 (1997)). But lower courts have shied away from applying strict scrutiny. See Peck, supra note
127. Lower courts’ resistance seems to prompt the question: is it time for the nine unelected lawyers
molding our laws to draw on the wisdom of circuit judges when it appears their decisions have not
provided workable standards? See id.
152. See Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 685 (6th Cir. 2016).
153. See id. at 684.
154. See id. at 691.
155. Id. at 686–87. The Sixth Circuit’s characterization of the presumptively lawful category as
“dictum” is seemingly inaccurate given Heller’s text and may contribute to the Supreme Court
eventually granting certiorari to a Second Amendment case to clarify. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627
n.26. Interestingly, Justice Clarence Thomas recently cited one of the Tyler concurrences in his dissent
to a denial of a petition for writ of certiorari for a claim challenging the constitutionality of a New
Jersey statute mandating an individual demonstrate “that he has a justifiable need to carry a handgun”
to obtain a carry permit. See Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1865 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The concurrence Justice Thomas cited opined that the Sixth Circuit was straying from Heller and
McDonald in applying heightened scrutiny and referenced “Heller’s discussion of ‘longstanding
prohibitions’” as law, rather than dictum. See Tyler, 837 F.3d at 702–03 (Batchelder, J., concurring).
This indicates, unsurprisingly, that Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh, who joined the part of
Justice Thomas’s dissent citing Tyler, think that the lower courts’ approach to Second Amendment
claims inappropriately deviates from precedent and that the presumptive lawfulness of “longstanding
prohibitions” is, in fact, law. See Rogers, 140 S. Ct. at 1866. While this dissent may provide
interesting insight into the personal opinions of individual Justices, it is important to note that dissents
to denial of certiorari are dicta that may violate collective decisionmaking principles under Article III
of the Constitution and tend to be more problematic than insightful—for a full discussion of the issues
these dissents implicate, see Barry P. McDonald, SCOTUS’s Shadiest Shadow Docket, 56 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1021 (2021).
156. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 686–87; see also United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692–94 (7th Cir.
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The Sixth Circuit even commented that “[t]o rely solely on Heller’s
presumption here would amount to a judicial endorsement of Congress’s
power to declare, ‘Once mentally ill, always so.’ This we will not do.”157 The
court further remarked that “Heller’s presumption of lawfulness should not be
used to enshrine a permanent stigma on anyone who has ever been committed
to a mental institution for whatever reason.”158 While not all courts have
adopted this sentiment, this recognition of the stigma surrounding mental
illness—and the impact the judiciary can have on this stigma—is a step in the
right direction.159
In contrast to Beers, however, on appeal, the plaintiff in Tyler argued
more specifically that “given Michigan’s lack of relief-from-disabilities
program, § 922(g)(4) was unconstitutional as applied to him because it
operated as an essentially permanent ban on his fundamental Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms.”160 Indeed, in August 2011, after
his eligibility to purchase a firearm was denied, the plaintiff, Tyler, attempted
to appeal the denial to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s NICS section.161
The NICS section denied his appeal, however, explaining that under the
NIAA, some states do have the ability to “pursue an ATF-approved relief of
disability for individuals . . . who have been committed to a mental
institution,’ but that ‘until Michigan has an ATF approved relief from
disabilities program in place Tyler’s federal firearm rights may not be
restored.’”162
Based on this denial, Tyler also averred that § 922(g)(4)’s application to
him “violate[d] the equal protection clause and that the government’s failure
to afford him notice and an opportunity to be heard on the matter violate[d]
the Due Process [C]lauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”163
Tyler’s equal protection and due process claims are somewhat germane to the
§ 922(g)(4) circuit split in light of the Ninth’s Circuit’s dictum in Mai,
suggesting such equal protection and due process challenges might be

2010) (holding that the presumptively lawful status of longstanding bans on firearms is not
conclusive).
157. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 688.
158. Id.
159. See id.; supra Part II.
160. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 684.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. Id.

928

[Vol. 49: 901, 2022]

Presumptively Awful
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

appropriate.164 In Tyler, however, the Sixth Circuit did not address these
claims because the parties “recognized and agreed that Tyler’s claims under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were coterminous with his Second
Amendment claim.”165 Thus, “Tyler’s Second Amendment claim [wa]s the
only issue on appeal.”166 In its opinion, the Sixth Circuit cited the defunding
of § 925(c) and Michigan’s lack of a qualifying program as support for
applying intermediate scrutiny.167 Interestingly, the concurrence in Tyler cited
Buck v. Bell, likening the government’s advocacy for § 922(g)(4)’s lifetime
application with Justice Holmes’s attitude toward mental illness in the
infamous 1927 decision.168 In referencing Buck v. Bell, the concurrence
commented that the assumption that one who has been committed will remain

164. See id.; Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2020).
165. Tyler, 237 F.3d at 685. The district court opinion quoted the Supreme Court’s statement that
“[w]here a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’
against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of
‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims” to support its finding that
Tyler’s equal protection and due process claims were coextensive with his Second Amendment claim,
although Tyler asserted a procedural due process claim, not a substantive due process claim. See Tyler
v. Holder, No. 1:12-CV-523, 2013 WL 356851, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2013), rev’d and remanded
sub nom. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated (Apr. 21, 2015), on reh’g en banc, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016), and rev’d and
remanded sub nom. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016). Indeed,
the district court cited the Sixth Circuit as specifically declining to consider claims that “conflate the
enumerated Second Amendment right with Equal Protection and Due Process protections under the
Fifth Amendment.” Id. (quoting United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 741 n.2 (6th Cir. 2010)). The
district court went on to note that the Ninth Circuit also “observed that ‘although the right to keep and
to bear arms for self-defense is a fundamental right, that right is more appropriately analyzed under
the Second Amendment.’” Id. (quoting Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 794 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated
by 681 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). But as discussed later, the Ninth Circuit more recently
implied that equal protection and due process claims may be appropriate in the context of challenges
to § 922(g)(4)’s application and § 40915’s options for relief. See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1113.
166. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 685. Note that Tyler asserted equal protection and due process claims
challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g)(4), the federal firearms ban, rather than § 40915, the relief
from disability statute. See id. at 684–85. Given that the district court in Galioto found that § 925(c),
the old relief statute, violated equal protection principles by including felons, but excluding those
adjudicated as mentally ill from obtaining relief, it follows that asserting equal protection and due
process claims against § 40915 could potentially avoid a finding that those claims are coterminous
with a Second Amendment claim against § 922(g)(4). See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco & Firearms v. Galioto, 477 U.S. 556, 558 (1986). As discussed later, the Ninth Circuit’s
comments in Mai may support this contention. See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1113; infra Section IV.C.
167. See Tyler, 837 F.3d at 684–85. The opinion stated that because “there is no path available for
Tyler to seek the restoration of his Second Amendment right,” “some evidence of the continuing need
to disarm those long ago adjudicated mentally ill is necessary to justify § 922(g)(4)’s means to its
ends.” Id. at 694.
168. See id. at 710 (Sutton, J., concurring).
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“a risk to himself or others for the rest of his life . . . is a remarkable
proposition.”169 The concurrence went on to state that “[i]t would be one thing
if the government were making this argument in 1927. But it is not. No one
today, I would have thought, thinks a prior institutionalization necessarily
equals a present mental illness.”170
F. The Ninth Circuit: Mai
While the parties in Tyler may have concluded that Tyler’s due process
and equal protection claims were “coextensive”171 with his Second
Amendment claims, in Mai v. United States, the Ninth Circuit indicated that
this is not necessarily the case.172 In Mai, plaintiff Mai argued that the
continued application of § 922(g)(4) violated his Second Amendment rights
because he had made many strides since his release from a nine-month
involuntary commitment in 2000 and no longer suffered from mental
illness.173 As a teenager, a Washington state court determined Mai was
“mentally ill and dangerous” and committed him “for mental health treatment
after he threatened himself and others.”174 After his release at age eighteen,
Mai obtained his GED, a bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree, obtained
employment, fathered two children, and lived “a socially-responsible, wellbalanced, and accomplished life.”175 In fact, Mai successfully petitioned a
Washington state court for relief from Washington’s state-law ban on his

169. Id.
170. Id. (citation omitted).
171. Id. at 688 (majority opinion).
172. See Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2020). To be clear, the Ninth Circuit
noted that the plaintiff did not bring equal protection and due process claims. See id. It is not certain
whether the court was commenting that those claims could have been brought in conjunction with
Mai’s Second Amendment claim, indicating the three claims may not be coterminous, or that Mai
could have successfully asserted those claims in lieu of the Second Amendment claim. See id. Additionally, it is worth noting that the Ninth Circuit’s comments somewhat imply that if Mai had brought
equal protection and due process claims, he could have challenged § 40915’s constitutionality, rather
than § 922(g)(4)’s. See id. But in Tyler, the plaintiff challenged § 922(g)(4)’s constitutionality with
his equal protection and due process claims, so it is perhaps possible equal protection and due process
claims could be brought against either statute. See Tyler v. Holder, No. 1:12-CV-523, 2013 WL
356851, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Apr. 21,
2015), on reh’g en banc, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016), and rev’d and remanded sub nom. Tyler v.
Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016).
173. See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1117.
174. Id. at 1110 (emphasis added).
175. Id.
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possession of firearms, and the court found that he “(1) is no longer required
to participate in court-ordered inpatient or outpatient treatment; (2) has
successfully managed the condition related to his commitment; (3) no longer
presents a substantial danger to himself, or the public; and (4) the symptoms
related to the commitment are not reasonably likely to recur.”176 This left only
§ 922(g)(4) in Mai’s path to obtaining a firearm.177
In addressing Mai’s Second Amendment claim, the court commented that
on appeal, Mai did not “seek the application of the substantive standards
defined in 34 U.S.C. § 40915” because he had “never asserted . . . an equalprotection claim that, because persons in thirty other states benefit from
programs applying § 40915’s substantive standards, he too is entitled to relief
or to an opportunity to meet those standards,” nor had he argued “that due
process demands the same results.”178 Just like Michigan, Washington is
another state that does not have a § 40915-compliant relief program.179 The
Ninth Circuit’s comments, however, seem to cut against the Tyler district
court’s use of the Ninth Circuit’s approach of analyzing the right to keep and
to bear arms for self-defense under the Second Amendment as support for the
district court’s classification of equal protection and due process claims as
coextensive with the Second Amendment claim.180 When assessing Mai’s
Second Amendment claim, the Ninth Circuit took an analytical approach
superior to that of its sister circuits.181
The Ninth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to Mai’s claim, finding
that the continued application of § 922(g)(4) did not violate Mai’s Second
Amendment rights.182 In December of 2020, Mai filed a petition for
certiorari.183 Since the Court vacated and remanded Beers v. Attorney General
United States in May of 2020 on mootness grounds, Mai v. United States

176. Id.
177. See id. at 1110–11.
178. Id. at 1113.
179. See State Profiles: NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP) Awards FY 2009–2020,
supra note 5.
180. See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1113; Tyler v. Holder, No. 1:12-CV-523, 2013 WL 356851, at *6 (W.D.
Mich. Jan. 29, 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d
308 (6th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Apr. 21, 2015), on reh’g en banc, 837
F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016), and rev’d and remanded sub nom. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,
837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 794 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated by
681 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).
181. See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1121.
182. See id.
183. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mai v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2566 (2021) (No. 20-819).
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would have provided the Court a second chance to clarify an issue it
previously could not, and given this circuit split, the Court would have been
wise to provide lower courts with much-needed guidance.184 Ultimately,
however, the Court denied certiorari in April of 2021.185
In sum, the § 922(g)(4) circuit split consists of three approaches to the
same issue.186 The Third Circuit assesses Second Amendment claims
challenging § 922(g)(4)’s constitutionality using its Binderup framework and
has never found the statute to be unconstitutional.187 The Sixth Circuit, on the
other hand, found § 922(g)(4) was unconstitutional through its application of
intermediate scrutiny.188 Finally, the Ninth Circuit also applied intermediate
scrutiny but found Congress’s interests in public safety sufficiently justified
§ 922(g)(4) and affirmed its constitutionality.189 These disjointed conclusions
and analytical approaches emphasize that the uncertainty created by Heller,
§ 922(g)(4), and § 40915 jeopardizes important individual rights, and
clarification is desperately needed.190

184. See Beers v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2758, 2759 (2020); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14–
17, Beers, 140 S. Ct. 2758 (No. 19-864) (commenting that the Court must grant certiorari to a challenge
to § 922(g)(4)’s constitutionality because the lower courts are “deeply fractured” about how to analyze
these claims).
185. See Mai, 141 S. Ct. at 2566.
186. See Beers v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 927 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2019); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 685 (6th Cir. 2016); Mai, 952 F.3d at 1121.
187. See Beers, 927 F.3d at 158.
188. See Tyler, 837 F.3d at 685.
189. See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1121.
190. See Beers, 927 F.3d at 158; Tyler, 837 F.3d at 685; Mai, 952 F.3d at 1121.

932

[Vol. 49: 901, 2022]

Presumptively Awful
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

IV. BALANCING PUBLIC POLICY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: THE IMPORTANT
INTERESTS AT ISSUE AND HOW WE CAN PROTECT THEM
Public safety and preserving the individual rights of those adjudicated as
mentally ill are both of great importance, and there is a way to simultaneously
and effectively serve these interests.191 Examining the relationship between
mental illness and gun violence reveals troubling narratives emerging in
American society.192 And providing appropriate procedures to all Americans
can help remedy some of the misconceptions surrounding gun violence and
refocus attention to gun control issues generally.193 If such procedures cannot
be established, courts assessing Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(4)
should take the Ninth Circuit’s approach, and plaintiffs should assert
additional claims of unconstitutionality.194
A. Mental Illness, Violence & Public Safety
While current gun control measures have not completely eradicated gun
violence, there is evidence that the NICS index has some efficacy in
preventing firearm purchases.195 For example, between 2009 and 2014, there
was a 285% increase in the number of “federal denials to purchase firearms
based on mental health records in the NICS [i]ndex,” from 923 denials to
3,557 denials.196 This is undoubtedly a positive step toward lowering gun
violence in the United States, but it is also important to recognize the
connection between mental illness and gun violence is not as strong as many
believe it to be.197 This misunderstanding has been caused, in part, by the
NRA’s perpetuation of the stigma around mentally ill individuals.198
A troubling cycle is emerging: a mass shooting occurs, the shooter is
deemed mentally ill, and gun rights activists point the finger at mental illness
and argue, “We [don’t] go around shooting people, the sick people do.”199 The
NRA has stated that it “backs the FBI-run instant background checks system
used by gun dealers when selling firearms. . . . It supports putting all those
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See infra Section IV.B.
See Swanson et al., supra note 56.
See Lexington, supra note 56; infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.C.
See Goggins & Gallegos, supra note 55, at 13.
Id.
See Mental Illness and Violence, 27 HARV. MENTAL HEALTH LETTER 1–3 (2011).
See Lexington, supra note 56.
Id.
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adjudicated mentally incompetent into the system, and deplores the fact that
many states are still putting only a small number of records into the system.”200
But there is a hidden, blame-shifting agenda behind this support.201 It is
generally accepted that background check systems benefit public health, and
it is necessary to safeguard society against allowing those who are mentally
ill and dangerous from obtaining firearms.202 The stigma surrounding mental
illness and gun violence, however, is not necessarily supported by statistics,203
and mental health experts fear the results of this mistaken association.204
In the wake of a rash of gun violence across the United States, mental
health stakeholders encounter “a painful dilemma.”205 The “goal of keeping
guns out of the hands of seriously mentally ill individuals” now stands as
“perhaps the only piece of common ground between gun rights and gun
control proponents.”206 In fact, after several mass shootings, public opinion
polls have “found that a majority of Americans across the political spectrum
favor[] ‘increasing government spending to improve mental health screening
and treatment as a strategy to prevent gun violence.’”207
An increase in mental health screening and treatment would be a welcome
change, yet society cannot allow the focus on mental illness and gun violence
to shift focus away from the issue of gun control generally.208 Mental health
200. Id.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See Swanson et al., supra note 56; Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Preventing Gun Violence
Involving People with Serious Mental Illness, in REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: INFORMING
POLICY WITH EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS 33–50 (Daniel W. Webster & Jon S. Vernick eds., 2013).
204. See Mental Illness and Violence, supra note 197. This article by no means asserts that there is
no connection between mental illness and gun violence; rather, it asserts that the public’s perception
of this connection is inaccurate, and as a result, the stigma surrounding the issue is disproportionate.
Id.
205. Swanson et al., supra note 56.
206. Id. at 366–67.
207. Id. at 367.
208. See Lexington, supra note 56; The Latest: Trump Focuses on Mental Illness, Not Gun Control,
AP NEWS (Aug. 16, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/ee17d07cdda74eeabc7f6d572cb8e6f8. In
2019, shortly after two mass shootings in Ohio and Texas, President Donald Trump told supporters at
a New Hampshire rally that to prevent mass gun violence, he wanted to reopen mental institutions
across the country. See The Latest: Trump Focuses on Mental Illness, Not Gun Control, supra.
Without offering any details on his proposal, he commented, “We will be taking mentally deranged
and dangerous people off of the streets so we won’t have to worry so much about them.” Id. These
comments illustrate the dilemma mental health experts face—mass shootings may provide a rare
opportunity to build support for improving America’s subpar mental healthcare system, but experts
fear a widespread perception that “the mentally ill are dangerous” will result in depriving mentally ill
individuals of their rights when statistics do not necessarily support the notion that mental illness is a
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experts and consumer advocates strongly reject “what they s[ee] as the
scapegoating of people with mental illnesses—the vast majority of whom,
epidemiologic data shows, will never act violently toward others—as if people
with mental health disorders were somehow responsible for gun violence in
general.”209 Mental health experts and fieldworkers find themselves facing
the “difficult prospect of debunking the public perception that ‘the mentally
ill are dangerous,’” while also “attempting to leverage that very perception to
build support for (much-needed) public funding to improve the mental health
care system in the United States.” 210 And it is important “to achieve this goal
without also spawning crisis-driven laws that might overreach in restricting
the rights and invading the privacy of people with mental illnesses.” 211
The § 922(g)(4) circuit split illustrates the difficulties of balancing an
individual’s personal rights with the potential that their mental illness could
lead to violence.212 Further, the split illustrates one of the ways placing
involuntary commitment into the hands of judicial officers and inefficient
advocates213 poses an issue—that it can lead to the lifelong deprivation of
individual rights, which only furthers the stigmatization of those suffering
from mental illness or brief emotional distress.214 Both the legislature and
courts must balance the concerns of perpetuating the stigma around the
mentally ill with public policy.215
Because involuntary commitment is often related to suicidal tendencies,
it is easy to argue that § 922(g)(4) indirectly invokes the parens patriae, or
“parent of the country,” doctrine—which assigns the government the
driving force behind increases in gun violence. See Swanson et al., supra note 56, at 367. Indeed,
public health experts focused on firearms-related injury and mortality in the United States recommend
a range of prevention policies to reduce gun violence. See generally Swanson et al., supra note 56.
These policies include a ban on military-style assault weapons and high-capacity ammunition
magazines, universal background checks for gun purchasers, and increased enforcement and penalties
for individuals charged with illegal gun sales—solutions that encompass keeping guns out of the hands
of mentally ill individuals, but do not focus on doing so as a primary means of reducing gun violence.
See generally id. The broad reach of experts’ proposed policies, rather than an emphasis on addressing
mental illness specifically, is largely a result of the lack of statistical support for the proposition that
mental illness is a predominant cause of gun violence. See Swanson et al., supra note 56, at 366–67.
209. Swanson et al., supra note 56, at 367.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See Beers v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 927 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2019); Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d
1106, 1117 (9th Cir. 2020).
213. See Poythress, supra note 33, at 210. Few advocates contest their client’s commitment, even
when there are valid grounds to. See id. at 215.
214. See Swanson et al., supra note 56, at 367.
215. See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1117.
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responsibility to intervene on behalf of citizens who cannot act in their own
best interest—by preventing those with a heightened risk of suicidal
tendencies from obtaining firearms.216 In this respect, the Ninth Circuit
appropriately deferred to the legislature in Mai, stating that “scientific
evidence cited by the government shows an increased risk of violence for
those who have been released from involuntary commitment.”217 The Ninth
Circuit went on to immediately address the risk of suicide, noting:
[A]uthors of one meta-analysis surveyed the available
scientific literature that studied the relationship between a
history of mental illness and the risk of suicide. The authors
found that studies of persons released from involuntary
commitment reported a combined “suicide risk [thirty-nine]
times that expected.” That extraordinarily increased risk of
suicide clearly justifies the congressional judgment that
those released from involuntary commitment pose an
increased risk of suicide.218
This discussion raises one of the central questions underlying the claims of
those who assert that § 922(g)(4) violates their individual rights: can someone
who was once involuntarily committed as posing a risk of danger return to
stable mental health?219 As the plaintiff in Mai argued, “although suicide risk
following release from commitment is extremely high, the risk ‘seems
highest’ initially and ‘diminishes thereafter.’”220 The plaintiff in Mai was
involuntarily committed for suicidal tendencies as a teenager, but in the
twenty years since his commitment, he showed no signs of mental illness.221
214. See Priest, supra note 66, at 363–64 (discussing the parens patriae doctrine and its relation to
involuntary commitment).
217. Mai, 952 F.3d at 1117.
218. Id. (citations omitted); see also Aaron J. Kivisto, Gun Violence Following Inpatient Psychiatric
Treatment: Offense Characteristics, Sources of Guns, and Number of Victims, 68 PSYCHIATRY SERVS.
1025, 1030 (2017) (“Even though firearm legislation targeting individuals with mental illness showed
little ability to reduce rates of firearm homicide, it is worth noting that this legislation might
nonetheless meaningfully reduce rates of firearm suicide.”).
219. See Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 684 (6th Cir. 2016); Mai, 952 F.3d
at 1108.
220. Mai, 952 F.3d at 1117.
221. See id. at 1110. As previously mentioned, since that involuntary commitment, he has obtained
multiple degrees, successfully held employment, married, and raised two children. See id. Similarly,
as also noted earlier, medical professionals in Tyler reported the plaintiff showed “no signs of mental
illness” and that the decision to involuntarily commit the plaintiff resulted from his “brief reacti[on]”
to the emotional circumstances he found himself in. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 684.
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What’s more, the Washington state firearm ban relief statute that qualified the
plaintiff in Mai as mentally competent enough to own a firearm only deviates
from federal disability relief statutes by a few words.222 All of this prompts
the question: what are appropriate legal standards for determining whether an
individual has returned to good mental health such that they pose no danger
to society?223 Has a deprivation of rights occurred if an individual can qualify
under one disability relief regulation, but cannot qualify under another that is
very similar?224
The thrust of this Comment is not to propose that the legislature and the
judiciary make efforts to lower the threshold for relief, or extend the ability to
petition for relief with the sole purpose of making it easier to obtain
firearms.225 Rather, by noting the grave consequences of the Supreme Court’s
holding in Buck v. Bell and the stigma that surrounds mental illness in the
United States, this Comment contends that our legislature and courts should
do a better job of protecting the individual rights of those who have been
adjudicated as mentally ill, given that the failure to do so can have dire
results.226 Specifically, where § 922(g)(4) applies, the inability to even
petition for relief from disability deprives those who have been involuntarily
committed of their due process and equal protection rights, and sometimes
their Second Amendment rights as well.227
What is more, voluntary commitment can transform into involuntary
commitment, which further illustrates the disturbing effect of this deprivation
of constitutional rights; in effect, asking for help can lead to what is more or
less a lifelong deprivation of three fundamental rights.228 As a matter of public

222. Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41.047(3)(c)(iii) (West 2020) (requiring a finding that
“[t]he petitioner no longer presents a substantial danger to himself of herself, or the public”), with 34
U.S.C. § 40915(a)(2) (requiring a determination that the petitioner “will not be likely to act in a manner
dangerous to public safety and that . . . relief would not be contrary to the public interest”).
223. See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1112; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 183, at 21–25.
224. See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1112.
225. See infra Part V. While it is true that some who were previously unable to even petition for
relief may be able to obtain firearms under the proposed legislative reform, this Comment advocates
for keeping a high threshold for relief to balance individual rights and public safety—this will preserve
the due process and equal protection rights of those adjudicated as mentally ill while only restoring
their Second Amendment rights if they pose no threat to public safety. See 34 U.S.C. § 40915; infra
Part V.
226. See infra Part V (arguing that the government should protect the individual rights of those with
mental illnesses and avoid marginalizing them); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927); Tyler, 837
F.3d at 710 (Sutton, J., concurring).
227. See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1110, 1115.
228. See Garakani et al., supra note 44.
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policy, does society really want to punish and discourage seeking muchneeded mental health treatment?229 Is it not in the best interest of public health
and safety to encourage seeking mental health treatment by ensuring that
fundamental rights are preserved?230 To avoid depriving Americans of their
individual rights based on the stigma surrounding mental illness, Congress
should provide a statutory route for those who have returned to good mental
health to apply to own a firearm.231 Further, if Congress fails to do so, courts
should take the Ninth Circuit’s approach in assessing claims challenging
§ 922(g)(4)’s constitutionality under the Second Amendment.232
B. Statutory Route to Relief
To assess how Congress can better safeguard the equal protection, due
process, and Second Amendment rights of those adjudicated as mentally ill, it
is necessary to further examine the previously mentioned NICS Improvement
Amendments Act of 2007 (NIAA).233 In seeking to “remedy weaknesses” in
the NICS index,234 “Congress authorized federal grants to encourage the states
229. See id.
230. See Swanson et al., supra note 56, at 374.
231. See generally Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425–426 (1979) (discussing how involuntary
commitment can “engender adverse social consequences to the individual”).
232. See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1115. As noted previously, though the Supreme Court has elevated the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms to a fundamental right, applying strict scrutiny can
lead to dangerous outcomes—which is why this Comment previously mentioned that lower courts are
seemingly justified in their refusal to do so. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778
(2010); Peck, supra note 127. While this Comment begrudgingly admits that the legislature and the
judiciary must acknowledge that the Supreme Court has found a “fundamental” individual right in the
Second Amendment and must safeguard that right to an extent, by no means is it in the best interest
of society to apply a “fatal in fact” level of scrutiny to gun control statutes, and in that sense, some
deviation from the Supreme Court’s unworkable standard is not unreasonable and has proved effective
across lower courts. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
233. See NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–80, § 103, 121 Stat. 2559,
2567 (2008).
234. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 682 (6th Cir. 2016); see also NICS
Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 § 2(9). Congress found that Brady background checks were
often delayed because the FBI did “not have automated access to complete information from the
[s]tates concerning persons prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm under [f]ederal or [s]tate
law.” NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 § 2(3). “Nearly [twenty-one million] criminal
records [were] [in]accessible by NICS, and millions of [accessible] criminal records [were] missing
critical data”—these shortcomings were predominantly caused by “data backlogs.” Id. § 2(4).
Further, Congress commented that both the Virginia Tech school shooting (the “deadliest campus
shooting in United States history” at that time), and a mass shooting at Our Lady of Peace Church in
Lynbrook, New York, would have been prevented by Brady background checks if the NICS index
were functioning as it was meant to. See id. §§ 2(8)–(9).
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to supply accurate and up-to-date information to federal firearm databases.”235
Eligibility for the grants, however, is contingent “on the creation of a relieffrom-disabilities program that allows individuals barred by § 922(g)(4) to
apply to have their rights restored.”236 State programs must grant relief “if the
circumstances regarding the disabilities . . . and the person’s record and
reputation, are such that the person will not be likely to act in a manner
dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be
contrary to the public interest.”237 In addition, “[t]he state program must also
‘permit[] a person whose application . . . is denied to file a petition with the
[s]tate court of appropriate jurisdiction for a de novo judicial review of the
denial.’”238
The NIAA states that its purpose is to provide states with the funds to
update records that are inaccessible due to “data backlogs” and to “automate[]
access to information concerning persons prohibited from possessing or
receiving a firearm because of mental illness, restraining orders, or
misdemeanor convictions for domestic violence.”239 It is unclear why only
approximately thirty states have elected to accept these federal grants.240 But
given that the NIAA specifies it seeks to improve the number of records the
FBI can access through NICS background checks,241 it follows that perhaps
the twenty states not accepting grants either do not have record-keeping
deficiencies, do not wish to share criminal and mental health records with the
FBI, or do not want to form the prerequisite relief program to receive the
grants.242
235. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 682.
236. Id.
237. Id. (quoting NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 § 105(a)(2)).
238. Id. at 683 (quoting NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 § 105(a)(3)).
239. NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 §§ 2(4), 2(5)(B).
240. See State Profiles: NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP) Awards FY 2009–2020,
supra note 5.
241. See NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 § 2(3).
242. See State Profiles: NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP) Awards FY 2009–2020,
supra note 5. To receive such grants, states must “certify, to the satisfaction of the Attorney General,
that the State has implemented a relief from disabilities program” in accordance with 34 U.S.C.
§ 40915. NCIS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 § 103(c). States must allocate “[n]ot less than
[three] percent, and no more than [ten] percent of each grant . . . to maintain the[ir] relief from
disabilities program.” Id. §§ 103(a)(1). It is unclear how expensive it is for states to institute these
relief from disabilities programs, and the relatively small percentage of these grants allocated to
maintaining such programs may be inadequate. See id. Further, as a condition of receiving a grant, a
“[s]tate shall specify the projects for which grant amounts will be used, and shall use such amounts
only as specified” to comply with the Act’s requirements that states collect and supply criminal and
mental health records in an electronic system providing “accurate and up-to-date information” for
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At first glance, it seems as though the proposed solution should be to
reinstate funding for § 925(c), which would allow individuals to petition
directly to the ATF for relief.243 This Comment, however, contends that
Congress should first alter § 925(c) to ease the burdens that prompted
defunding and then re-fund the program.244 A proposed alteration that may
ease Congress’s concerns about the “very difficult and subjective task”245 of
determining whether to grant relief would be to allow citizens of the twenty
no-grant states to either (a) petition to their state law firearms ban relief
programs, and if relief is granted under state law, submit evidence of that relief
to the ATF for assessment,246 or (b) if the state does not have such a program,
allow citizens to petition directly to the ATF.247
NICS background checks. Id. § 103(b)(1), 103(d).
243. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(c); S. REP. NO. 102–353, at 19 (1992).
244. See S. REP. NO. 102–353, at 19.
245. Id. As noted earlier, the difficulty of such a task, as well as the “devastating consequences for
innocent citizens if the wrong decision is made,” were Congress’s purported reasons for defunding the
federal relief program. Id.
246. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41.047 (West 2020). Washington, a state not accepting
NIAA grants, has a program to petition for relief from state law firearm bans. Id.; see, e.g., Zahedi et
al., supra note 65, at 546 (noting that California also does not accept NIAA grants and allows
individuals to petition for relief from state firearm bans). The ATF issues a “Certification of
Qualifying State Relief from Disabilities Program” to states that have complied with the “minimum
criteria” of § 40915. Certification of Qualifying State Relief from Disabilities Program, U.S. DEP’T
JUST.
BUREAU
ALCOHOL,
TOBACCO,
FIREARMS,
&
EXPLOSIVES,
https://www.atf.gov/file/11731/download (Mar. 2016). The minimum criteria checklist on this
Certification includes the requirement that “[t]he petition for relief is considered by the lawful
authority in accordance with principles of due process.” Id. This requirement highlights the fact that
having no qualifying relief from disabilities program is clearly a deprivation of due process. See id.
247. See State Profiles: NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP) Awards FY 2009–2020,
supra note 5. California, for instance, does not have a § 40915-compliant relief program. See id.
Nonetheless, California provides that a person who has been involuntarily committed “shall not have
in his or her possession or under his or her custody or control, or purchase or receive, or attempt to
purchase or receive, any firearms whatsoever or any other deadly weapon for a period of five years”
after commitment. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 8100(b)(1) (West 2014). At the five-year mark, an
individual may petition the California Superior Court and receive a hearing in which a district attorney
represents the state as the respondent. See id. at § 8100(b)(2)(B)–(3)(A). The state has the burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “the person would not be likely to use firearms in a safe
and lawful manner.” Id. § 8100(3)(B). This standard for relief is seemingly a lower threshold than
§ 40915 and would likely need to be heightened for the ATF to grant approval. See generally id.
Interestingly, national gun-control advocates and experts view California’s 5150 detainment, or
involuntary commitment system, and its accompanying firearms as a model way for “mass shooters
[to get help] before they open fire.” Dan Freedman, Gun-Control Advocates See 5150 Holds as Model,
SF GATE (Oct. 12, 2013), https://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Gun-control-advocates-see-5150holds-as-model-4891244.php. There are instances where individuals “lose their gun rights for nothing
more than a brief emotional outburst,” but in the cited examples, all individuals experiencing these
outbursts “eventually regained their gun rights.” Id. California may serve as an example where less
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Another issue that arises with this proposal is that some state relief
programs have lower standards for relief than § 40915, the current federal
relief statute operating through programs established by state governments.248
This is best exemplified by the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Mai.249 There, the
Washington law governing relief from the state-law prohibition on firearm
possession required a determination that the person “no longer presents a
substantial danger to himself or herself, or the public.”250 By contrast,
§ 40915 requires a finding that “the person will not be likely to act in a manner
dangerous to public safety.”251 Further, § 40915 requires finding that granting
“relief would not be contrary to the public interest,” whereas the Washington
law does not require any inquiry of this nature.252 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that, “the federal standard is more stringent than the Washington
standard. Accordingly, unless Washington chooses in the future to create a
program that meets the requirements of § 40915, [Mai] has no avenue for
relief from § 922(g)(4)’s prohibition.”253 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit’s comment
implying that Mai may have a potential avenue for relief if Washington’s state
law were on par with § 40915’s standards is promising.254
In particular, it is promising because states are only required to institute
the § 40915-compliant programs in order to receive federal grants, so it
follows that states may already have, or can institute, § 40915-compliant
programs without accepting NIAA grants.255 The Ninth Circuit’s remark
further shows that states can likely offer programs providing routes to relief
from § 922(g)(4) without meeting NIAA record-improvement requirements,

stringent firearm prohibitions are offset by a particularly efficient involuntary commitment system.
See id. Nonetheless, the federal firearms ban must account for all states’ involuntary commitments
systems, and thus, maintaining the heightened standards for relief in § 40915 is necessary. See 34
U.S.C. § 40915.
248. See Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2020).
249. See id.
250. Id. (quoting § 9.41.047(3)(c)(iii)).
251. 34 U.S.C. § 40915(a)(2) (emphasis added).
252. Compare id., with § 9.41.047.
253. Mai, 952 F.3d at 1112. From a public policy perspective, though it may seem that the
difference between § 40915’s standards and Washington’s relief standards are minor, given the public
safety interests at issue it is very important to maintain a high standard for relief—and the Ninth Circuit
appropriately deferred to Congress’s judgment in refusing to find that Washington’s standards did not
warrant granting relief. See id. at 1112, 1121.
254. See id. at 1112, 1120.
255. See NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–80, § 2(9), 121 Stat. 2559,
2560 (2008).
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which may be why some states do not accept such grants.256 Such an option
may be appealing for both states and the federal government—states can avoid
submitting to NIAA requirements and in some cases improve their public
safety by instituting more stringent relief standards than the existing state
standards.257 Concurrently, instituting an altered version of § 925(c) becomes
more attractive to the federal government, as it takes a chunk of the
decisionmaking and administration costs off of the ATF’s shoulders and
places it onto the states’, as the ATF can simply reapprove petitions already
granted by states that have § 40915-compliant programs.258 The ATF would
be responsible for approving state programs as § 40915-compliant and would
otherwise be responsible for approving individual petitions for states failing
to create such programs.259
Accordingly, this Comment offers a proposed amended version of
§ 925(c):
A person who is prohibited from possessing, shipping,
transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition may make
application to the Attorney General for relief from the
disabilities imposed by [f]ederal laws with respect to the
acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, transportation, or
possession of firearms, and the Attorney General may grant
such relief if it is established to his satisfaction that the
circumstances regarding the disability, and the applicant’s
record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be
likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that
the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public
interest. The Attorney General may grant such relief if it is
established to his satisfaction that the applicant’s disability,
record, and reputation have been assessed by a [s]tate court,
256. See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1120; NCIS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 § 2(9).
257. See NCIS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 § 2(9).
258. See id.; Mai, 952 F.3d at 1112. The ATF could potentially use the aforementioned certification
process it has in place to approve these programs in no-grant states but alter the certification checklist
to omit the “Required Updates to State and Federal Records” criteria. See Certification of Qualifying
State Relief from Disabilities Program, supra note 246.
259. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). Given that only approximately twenty states do not currently have
§ 40915-compliant programs through the NIAA, approving preexisting or newly instituted programs,
or even reviewing individual petitions, would be significantly less burdensome than it was from 1986–
1992, when § 925(c) was funded. See id.; State Profiles: NICS Act Record Improvement Program
(NARIP) Awards FY 2009–2020, supra note 5.
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board, commission, or other lawful authority operating
under a [s]tate relief from disabilities program implemented
in accordance with 34 U.S.C. § 40915, and such an authority
has found that the applicant’s record and reputation, are such
that the person will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous
to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not
be contrary to the public interest. Any person whose
application for relief from disabilities is denied by the
Attorney General may file a petition with the United States
district court for the district in which he resides for a judicial
review of such denial. The court may in its discretion admit
additional evidence where failure to do so would result in a
miscarriage of justice. A licensed importer, licensed
manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector
conducting operations under this chapter, who makes
application for relief from the disabilities incurred under this
chapter, shall not be barred by such disability from further
operations under his license pending final action on an
application for relief filed pursuant to this section.
Whenever the Attorney General grants relief to any person
pursuant to this section he shall promptly publish in the
Federal Register notice of such action, together with the
reasons therefor.260
Enacting this amended statute and re-funding the ATF’s relief program would
provide a statutory road to relief that preserves individual rights, requires less
federal funding and decisionmaking than the previous § 925(c) program did,
and could potentially encourage states to increase their standards for obtaining
relief, and thus improve public safety nationwide.261
260. See § 925(c); 34 U.S.C. § 40915. The majority of § 925(c) stays intact, while the added
provision reads:
The Attorney General may grant such relief if it is established to his satisfaction
that the applicant’s disability, record, and reputation have been assessed by a
[s]tate court, board, commission, or other lawful authority operating under a
[s]tate relief from disabilities program implemented in accordance with 34
U.S.C. § 40915, and such an authority has found that the applicant’s record and
reputation, are such that the person will not be likely to act in a manner
dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be
contrary to the public interest.
See § 925(c); § 40915.
261. See supra Section IV.B.
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C. Assessing Second Amendment Claims Challenging § 922(g)(4)’s
Constitutionality: The Superior Approach
Alternatively, if no such statutory relief is provided and plaintiffs
continue to litigate this matter, a Second Amendment claim is arguably the
strongest claim of unconstitutionality to bring against § 922(g)(4).262 Until
the Supreme Court speaks on the matter, the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Mai
is the superior approach amongst the circuits who have faced this issue, and
courts should follow the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning.263 In Mai, the court held
that intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny should apply to Mai’s claim.264
The Ninth Circuit then deferred to Congress in finding that § 922(g)(4)
reasonably fits with Congress’s “important goal of reducing gun violence,”
particularly suicide, and thus, it withstood intermediate scrutiny.265
This approach is superior to the Third Circuit’s approach because the
Binderup framework provides no clear guidelines for how a plaintiff may
distinguish themself from a “historically barred class,” and as such, courts’
determinations on the matter are seemingly arbitrary, and the ability to prevail
is seemingly illusory.266 Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s approach is superior to
the Sixth Circuit’s approach because, while statistics may not align with the
public’s beliefs about mental illness and gun violence, it is a stretch to hold,
as the Sixth Circuit held in Tyler, that there is an inconsequential relationship
between § 922(g)(4) and the policy purposes of suicide prevention and crime
reduction.267 Further, when it comes to firearms, it is undoubtedly in the best
interest of public safety to defer to Congress’s heightened standard for relief
262. See Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016). The body of
§ 922(g)(4) case law shows a plaintiff can claim the statute is unconstitutional as applied to them
specifically. See, e.g., Redford v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,
691 F.2d 471, 473 (10th Cir. 1982) (assessing a claim that § 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional as applied
to the plaintiff); Tyler, 837 F.3d at 699 (finding § 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional as applied to the
plaintiff). Further, that the plaintiff in Beers could not distinguish himself from others subject to the
ban supports the contention that these Second Amendment claims are individualized considerations.
See Beers v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 927 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2019). At the time, it had been only seven
years since Beers was released from involuntary commitment. See id. at 152.
263. See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1110–21.
264. See id. at 1115.
265. Id. at 1121.
266. See Beers, 927 F.3d at 157.
267. See Tyler, 837 F.3d at 695. Further, given that the Sixth Circuit commented on Tyler’s failure
to obtain relief based on Michigan’s lack of a § 40915-compliant program, it seems the Sixth Circuit
may have been using a bit of results-oriented reasoning and dragging equal protection and due process
issues into the spotlight, despite the parties’ agreement that such claims were coterminous. See id. at
684.
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from prohibitions on firearms.268 The Ninth Circuit was mindful of this when
holding that Washington’s similar, but slightly less stringent, standards for
relief were insufficient to show Mai should obtain relief without meeting
§ 40915’s precise standards.269
The Ninth Circuit’s approach also appropriately avoided furthering the
stigma surrounding mental illness and gun violence by pointing to Mai’s
successes in life and stating, “We emphatically do not subscribe to the notion
that ‘once mentally ill, always so.’. . . [W]e have no reason to doubt[] that
Plaintiff is no longer mentally ill.”270 The Ninth Circuit carefully framed its
decision to emphasize that it was deferring to Congress’s reasoning and broad
public policy considerations, rather than basing its decision on the notion that
Mai is permanently branded as mentally ill.271 For these reasons, out of the
three circuits that have addressed this issue, the Ninth Circuit has undoubtedly
formulated the best approach to Second Amendment claims challenging
§ 922(g)(4).272
D. Asserting Equal Protection and Due Process Claims
Lastly, it is worth noting that plaintiffs asserting Second Amendment
claims against the § 922(g)(4) federal firearms ban should assert equal
protection and due process claims as well, or perhaps instead.273 As a
threshold matter, it may be better to bring equal protection and due process
claims against the § 40915 federal relief statute, rather than § 922(g)(4).274
First, the Ninth Circuit’s comments in Mai implied that doing so would be
appropriate.275 Next, the district court in Galioto found that § 925(c) violated
equal protection principles by allowing felons to petition for relief and
excluding those adjudicated as mentally ill from doing so.276 Because Galioto

268. See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1112.
269. See id.
270. Id. at 1110, 1121.
271. See id. at 1121.
272. See id. at 1110–21.
273. See Tyler v. Holder, No. 1:12-CV-523, 2013 WL 356851, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 29,
2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308 (6th Cir.
2014), reh’g en banc granted (Apr. 21, 2015), on reh’g en banc, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016),
and rev’d and remanded sub nom. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir.
2016); Mai, 952 F.3d at 1113.
274. See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1113.
275. See id.
276. See Galioto v. Dep’t of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 602 F. Supp. 682,
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was decided prior to McDonald’s holding that the Second Amendment creates
a fundamental right to keep and bear arms, there was no discrimination as to
the exercise of a fundamental right at issue, and this equal protection case was
decided on the basis of class discrimination against those adjudicated as
mentally ill.277
Though Galioto was vacated after § 925(c) was altered to include those
adjudicated as mentally ill, this case shows that (a) federal courts have found
individuals adjudicated as mentally ill to be a class, and (b) federal courts have
found that this class warrant heightened scrutiny.278 Indeed, the district court
concluded that “persons with histories of mental illness are a quasi-suspect
class deserving of intensified ‘intermediate’ scrutiny.”279 In doing so, the
district court pointed to the fact that the Ninth Circuit had already “found
former mental patients to be a ‘quasi-suspect’ class entitled to ‘intermediate’
scrutiny.”280 The Ninth Circuit remarked that “constitutional concerns are
heightened by any classification scheme singling out former mental patients
for differential treatment because of the possibility that the scheme will
implement ‘inaccurate and stereotypic fears’ about former mental patients.”281
Though the Supreme Court has altered the equal protection framework since
the Ninth Circuit decided this case and it is not certain that former mental
patients would warrant intermediate scrutiny today, this precedent shows that
courts are likely to find this class is entitled to some level of heightened
scrutiny.282 Moreover, given that the language of § 925(c) and § 40915 is
686 (D.N.J. 1985), vacated sub nom. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms
v. Galioto, 477 U.S. 556 (1986).
277. See Galioto, 477 U.S. at 558–60; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
278. See Galioto, 602 F. Supp. at 686.
279. Id. This case was decided only a few years before City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
the case from which the Supreme Court draws its test to slot new classes and determine what level of
scrutiny the class warrants. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
280. Galioto, 602 F. Supp. at 687 (citing J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 720 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1983)).
281. Id. (citing City of Tacoma, 720 F.2d at 1130–31).
282. See id. at 685–87; City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440–47 (creating a new class, nonsuspect but
vulnerable, warranting meaningful rational basis scrutiny, which requires the government to show
there is a legitimate reason for the law and the means was a reasonable way to achieve that end in
order to pass constitutional muster). Professor Barry McDonald, expert on constitutional law and the
Supreme Court, commented that it is unclear how asserting an equal protection claim based on class
discrimination against those involuntarily committed would result. Zoom Interview with Barry
McDonald, Professor of Law, Pepperdine Caruso School of Law (Mar. 3, 2021). He further
commented that it is possible to do so, and with no precedent on the issue since prior to City of
Cleburne, advocates would just have to make their best possible arguments for heightened scrutiny.
See id. Asserting an equal protection claim based on discrimination against the exercise of a
fundamental right to keep and bear arms, on the other hand, would likely be coterminous with the
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nearly identical in terms of the standard for relief, Galioto shows that it may
indeed be possible for a plaintiff to prevail on an equal protection claim
challenging the constitutionality of § 40915.283
Asserting a due process claim, on the other hand, could prove to be a more
difficult task.284 As previously mentioned, to assert a procedural due process
claim, one must first show they have a cognizable property or liberty interest
grounded in positive law in whatever they are asserting the government has
deprived them of without fair procedure.285 While the right to keep and bear
arms is undoubtedly both a property and a liberty interest grounded in the
Second Amendment, the cognizable interest in asserting a due process claim
against either § 922(g)(4) (as the plaintiff in Tyler did) or against § 40915, is
the same; therefore, a court could potentially find either claim is coterminous
with the Second Amendment.286 With little to no precedent, predicting how
courts might handle a procedural due process claim is a bit muddier than
making equal protection predictions.287 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit in Mai
commented on the plaintiff’s failure to bring both an equal protection claim
and a due process claim, indicating the court may not find either to be
coterminous with Second Amendment claims.288
Finally, a tactic to avoid having equal protection and due process claims
declared coterminous with a Second Amendment claim could be to only bring
equal protection and due process claims.289 While courts can declare claims
as coterminous, they cannot transform a claim under the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment into a Second Amendment claim.290 There is no way of knowing
Second Amendment claims, and courts would probably ignore the equal protection claim and assess
constitutionality under the Second Amendment. See id.
283. See Galioto, 602 F. Supp. at 685–87; compare 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), with 34 U.S.C. § 40915.
284. See Tyler v. Holder, No. 1:12-CV-523, 2013 WL 356851, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 29,
2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308 (6th Cir.
2014), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Apr. 21, 2015), on reh’g en banc, 837 F.3d 678 (6th
Cir. 2016), and rev’d and remanded sub nom. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678
(6th Cir. 2016).
285. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 322–35 (1976); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
569–72 (1972).
286. See Tyler, 2013 WL 356851, at *2, *6.
287. See id. at *6. Professor McDonald commented that procedural due process is a “totally
different animal” from the Second Amendment, and that a plaintiff might be able to “get something
out of a procedural due process claim” that they could not get from asserting a Second Amendment
claim alone. Zoom Interview with Barry McDonald, Professor of Law, Pepperdine Caruso School of
Law (Mar. 3, 2021).
288. See Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2020).
289. See id.
290. See id.
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how courts will assess equal protection and due process claims regarding
§ 40915; however, given that these frameworks are better established than the
Second Amendment’s framework, courts may more easily and more favorably
assess these claims—particularly on equal protection class discrimination
grounds.291
Though there is no binding precedent establishing an approach to
assessing due process and equal protection challenges to § 922(g)(4) and
§ 40915, Galioto and the Ninth Circuit’s dictum in Mai indicate such claims
might be effective.292 Plaintiffs challenging these statutes’ constitutionality
should undoubtedly highlight the various rights they jeopardize and assert
equal protection and due process claims alongside Second Amendment
claims, or alone.293
V. MOVING AWAY FROM MARGINALIZATION AND TOWARD PROTECTION
Ultimately, it is appropriate to return to Buck v. Bell to draw some
parallels.294 There, the Supreme Court found that Buck’s due process, equal
protection, and procreative rights295 were not worthy of protection based on
her status as mentally ill.296 Buck’s institutionalization was the product of an
inadequate mental-health-care system,297 and the Supreme Court’s decision
was the byproduct of the popularity of eugenics in the United States at the
time.298 Here, the involuntary commitment system is full of inadequacies that
range from ineffective advocates and judicial officers299 to “illusory”
proceedings.300 Moreover, courts have persistently acknowledged the
American stigma surrounding both mental illness301 and mental illness as it
291. See Galioto v. Dep’t of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 602 F. Supp. 682,
686 (D.N.J. 1985), vacated sub nom. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms
v. Galioto, 477 U.S. 556 (1986).
292. See Galioto, 602 F. Supp. at 686; Mai, 952 F.3d at 1113.
293. See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1113.
294. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); supra Section II.A.
295. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. The right to procreate was not recognized by the Supreme Court
until much later in the 1942 case Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, so Buck’s claims were
limited to alleged due process and equal protection violations. See id.; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
296. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
297. See Lombardo, supra note 25, at 34–35.
298. See The Supreme Court Ruling That Led to 70,000 Forced Sterilizations, supra note 27.
299. See Poythress, supra note 33.
300. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979).
301. See, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 710 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton,
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relates to firearms302—stigmas reinforced by widespread misperceptions and
laws failing to protect the individual rights of the mentally ill.303
Roughly 70,000 Americans were sterilized as a result of the Court’s
decision in Buck v. Bell.304 Indeed, “the instinct to ‘demonize’ people who are
different is still prevalent in the [United States] today.”305 The goal of
providing everyone with a means to petition for relief is not only to ensure
that those adjudicated as mentally ill will have their equal protection, due
process, and Second Amendment rights preserved—it is to cement the
principle that this country protects the constitutional rights of all Americans,
regardless of their perceived differences.306 Buck v. Bell has shown us the
grave consequences of failing to protect the rights of the institutionalized.307
And today, as we see the perpetuation of the narrative that the connection
between mental illness and violence justifies depriving those who have been
involuntarily committed not only of their Second Amendment rights but of
their equal protection and due process rights as well, we approach the slippery
slope American society went down as a result of Buck v. Bell.308
If lawmakers can deprive the mentally ill of their equal protection and due
process rights in this context, who is to say they will not do so in others?309
Providing the option to petition for relief safeguards the equal protection and
due process rights of a group that has historically been subject to stigma and
similar deprivations and avoids setting the standard that needlessly
marginalizing a group’s rights is justified so long as a partial justification
exists.310 In light of these interests, this Comment proposes altering and refunding § 925(c) to preserve the equal protection and due process rights of
J., concurring) (commenting on the stigma surrounding mental illness and the ways in which
§ 922(g)(4) perpetuates that stigma); J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 720 F.2d 1126, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 1983)
(noting that violating former mental patients’ equal protection rights furthers the stereotypic fears
surrounding the class).
302. See Lexington, supra note 56.
303. See Swanson et al., supra note 56.
304. See The Supreme Court Ruling That Led to 70,000 Forced Sterilizations, supra note 27; see
generally Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
305. The Supreme Court Ruling That Led to 70,000 Forced Sterilizations, supra note 27.
306. See supra Part IV.
307. See The Supreme Court Ruling That Led to 70,000 Forced Sterilizations, supra note 27.
308. See id.
309. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 207; Lombardo, supra note 25.
310. See supra Part IV. While depriving those who have been involuntarily committed of their
Second Amendment rights is justifiable in the interest of public safety, depriving this class of people
of their equal protection and due process rights by failing to provide a route for relief is a failure to
uphold the Constitution and only furthers the stigma surrounding mental illness. See supra Part IV.
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those who have been adjudicated as mentally ill.311 Alternatively, courts
should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s approach in assessing Second Amendment
claims challenging § 922(g)(4).312 Finally, plaintiffs seeking relief should
consider challenging § 40915 on equal protection and due process grounds.313
Striking an appropriate balance between public safety and the preservation of
the constitutional rights of those who have been adjudicated as mentally ill is
a difficult task that the legislature and the judiciary have struggled with
throughout American history.314 The § 922(g)(4) circuit split provides an
opportunity to remedy an unconstitutional deprivation of rights, clarify
unworkable Second Amendment standards, and extend a high threshold for
firearms relief to further public safety.315
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